Report on MD5 Performance
Measuring how fast MD5 can authenticate data in hardware and software, and what to do about it.
Touch, J., "Report on MD5 Performance", RFC 1810, DOI 10.17487/RFC1810, June 1995, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1810>.
@misc{rfc1810,
series = {Request for Comments},
number = 1810,
howpublished = {RFC 1810},
publisher = {RFC Editor},
doi = {10.17487/RFC1810},
url = {https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1810},
author = {J. Touch},
title = {{Report on MD5 Performance}},
pagetotal = 7,
year = 1995,
month = jun,
} RFC text
Contents
Network Working Group J. Touch
Request for Comments: 1810 ISI
Category: Informational June 1995
Report on MD5 Performance
Status of this Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo
does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of
this memo is unlimited.
Abstract
MD5 is an authentication algorithm, which has been proposed as the
default authentication option in IPv6. When enabled, the MD5
algorithm operates over the entire data packet, including header.
This RFC addresses how fast MD5 can be implemented in software and
hardware, and whether it supports currently available IP bandwidth.
MD5 can be implemented in existing hardware technology at 256 Mbps,
and in software at 87 Mbps. These rates cannot support current IP
rates, e.g., 100 Mbps TCP and 130 Mbps UDP over ATM. If MD5 cannot
support existing network bandwidth using existing technology, it will
not scale as network speeds increase in the future. This RFC is
intended to alert the IP community about the performance limitations
of MD5, and to suggest that alternatives be considered for use in
high speed IP implementations.
Introduction
MD5 is an authentication algorithm, which has been proposed as one
authentication option in IPv6 [1]. RFC 1321 describes the MD5
algorithm and gives a reference implementation [3]. When enabled,
the MD5 algorithm operates over the entire data packet, including
header (with dummy values for volatile fields). This RFC addresses
how fast MD5 can be implemented in software and hardware, and whether
it supports currently available IP bandwidth.
This RFC considers the general issue of checksumming and security at
high speed in IPv6. IPv6 has no header checksum (which IPv4 has
[5]), but proposes an authentication digest over the entire body of
the packet (including header where volatile fields are zeroed) [1].
This RFC specifically addresses the performance of that
authentication mechanism.
Measurements
The performance of MD5 was measured. The code was an optimized
version of the MD5 reference implementation from the RFC [3], and is
available for anonymous FTP [7]. The following are the results of
the performance test "md5 -t", modified to prohibit on-chip caching
of the data block:
87 Mbps DEC Alpha (190 Mhz)
33 Mbps HP 9000/720
48 Mbps IBM RS/6000 7006 (PPC 601 @80 Mhz)
31 Mbps Intel i486/66 NetBSD
44 Mbps Intel Pentium/90 NeXTStep
52 Mbps SGI/IP-20 IRIX 5.2
37 Mbps Sun SPARC-10/51, SPARC-20/50 SunOS 4.1.3
57 Mbps Sun SPARC-20/71 SunOS 4.1.3
These rates do not keep up with currently available IP bandwidth,
e.g., 100 Mbps TCP and 130 Mbps UDP over a Fore SBA-200 ATM host
interface in a Sun SPARC-20/71.
Values as high as 100 Mbps have been reported for the DEC Alpha (190
Mhz). These values reflect on-chip caching of the data. It is not
clear at this time whether in-memory, off-chip cache, or on-chip
cache performance measures are more relevant to IP performance.
Analysis of the MD5 Algorithm
The MD5 algorithm is a block-chained hashing algorithm. The first
block is hashed with an initial seed, resulting in a hash. The hash
is summed with the seed, and that result becomes the seed for the
next block. When the last block is computed, it's "next-seed' value
becomes the hash for the entire stream. Thus, the seed for block
depends on both the hash and the seed of its preceding block. As a
result, blocks cannot be hashed in parallel.
Each 16-word (64-byte) block is hashed via 64 basic steps, using a
4-word intermediate hash, and collapsing the intermediate hash at the
end. The 64 steps are 16 groups of 4 steps, one step per
intermediate hash word. This RFC uses the following notation (as
from RFC-1321 [3]):
A,B,C,D intermediate hash words
X[i] input data block
T[i] sine table lookup
<< i rotate i bits
F logical functions of 3 args
The subscripts to X, I, and << are fixed for each step, and are
omitted here. There are four different logical functions, also
omitted. Each 4-step group looks like:
A = B + ((A + F(B,C,D) + X[i] + T[i]) << i)
D = A + ((D + F(A,B,C) + X[i] + T[i]) << i)
C = D + ((C + F(D,A,B) + X[i] + T[i]) << i)
B = C + ((B + F(C,D,A) + X[i] + T[i]) << i)
Note that this has the general form shown below. Due to the
complexity of the function 'f', these equations cannot be transformed
into a less serial set.
A = f(D); B = f(A); C = f(B); D = f(C)
Each steps is composed of two table lookups, one rotation, a 3-
component logical operation, and 4 additions. The best
parallelization possible leaves F(x,y,z) to the last step, waiting as
long as possible for the result from the previous step. The
resulting tree is shown below.
(t0) B* C C D X T
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
\/ \/ \ /
t1 op op A + X T
\ / \ / | |
\ / \ / | |
\/ \/ \ /
t2 op + (t0) B* C C D A +
\ / | | | | \ /
\ / \ | | / \ /
\ / \\// \/
t3 + t1 op +
| \ /
| \ /
| \ /
t4 << B* t2 + B*
\ / \ /
\ / << /
\ / \ /
t5 + t3 +
| |
| |
| |
A** A**
Binary operation tree Optimized hardware tree
This diagram assumes that each operation takes one unit time. The
tree shows the items that depend on the previous step as B*, and the
item that the next step depends on as A**. Sequences of the binary
operation tree cannot be overlapped, but the optimized hardware tree
can (by one time step).
There are 4 steps processed per word of input, ignoring inter-block
processing. The speed of the overall algorithm depends on how fast
we can process these 4 steps, vs. the bandwidth of one word of input
being processed.
The binary tree takes 5 time units per step of the algorithm, and
permits at best 3-way parallelism (at time t1). In software, this
means it takes 5 * 4 = 20 instructions per word input. A computer
capable of M MIPS can support a data bandwidth of M/20 * 32 Mbps,
i.e., bits per second equal to 1.6x its MIPS rate. Therefore, a 100
MIPS machine can support a 160 Mbps stream.
Parallel software rate in Mbps = 1.6 * MIPS rate
This assumes that register reads and writes are overlapped with
computation entirely. Without any parallelism, there are 8
operations per step, and 4 steps per word, so 32 operations per word,
i.e., the data rate in Mbps would be identical to the MIPS rate:
Serial software rate in Mbps = MIPS rate
Predictions using SpecInt92 numbers as MIPS estimators can be
compared with measured rates [2]:
Spec- Predicted MD5
Int92 Upper-Bound Measured Machine
------------------------------------------------------------
122 122-195 87 Mbps DEC Alpha (190 Mhz)
48 48- 77 33 Mbps HP 9000/720
88 88-141 48 Mbps IBM RS/6000 7006 (PPC 601 @80 Mhz)
32 32- 51 31 Mbps Intel i486/33 NetBSD
90 90-144 44 Mbps Intel Pentium/90 NeXTStep
90 90-144 52 Mbps SGI/IP-20 IRIX 5.2
65 65-104 37 Mbps Sun SPARC-10/51 SunOS 4.1.3
126 126-202 57 Mbps Sun SPARC-20/71 SunOS 4.1.3
The hardware rate takes 3 time units per step, i.e. 3 * 4 = 12 time
units per word of input. Hardware capable of doing an operation
(e.g., 32-bit addition) in N nanoseconds can support a data bandwidth
of 32/12/N bps, i.e., 2/3N bps.
Hardware rate in Mbps = 8/3N * 1,000
For CMOS, an operation (32-bit addition, including register retrieval
and storage) costs about 5.2 ns (2.6 ns per add, 2 ns for latching)
[6]. There are 6 clocks through the most highly-parallelized
implementation, resulting in 31.2 ns per 32-bit word, or 256 Mbps
[6]. This will not keep pace with existing hardware, which is
capable of link speeds in excess of 622 Mbps (ATM).
By comparison, IPv4 uses the Internet Checksum [5]. This checksum
can be performed in 32-bit-wide units in excess of 1 Gbps in an
existing, low-cost PLD. The checksum can also be parallelized by
computing partial sums and reducing the result.
One Proposed Solution
There are several ways to increase the performance of the IPv6
authentication mechanism. One is to increase the hardware
performance of MD5 by slightly modifying the algorithm, the other is
to propose a replacement algorithm. This RFC discusses briefly the
modification of MD5 for high-speed hardware implementation.
Alternate algorithms, capable of 3.5x the speed of MD5, have been
discussed elsewhere [6].
MD5 uses block chaining to ensure sensitivity to block order. Block
chaining also prevents arbitrary parallelism, which can be as much a
benefit to the spoofer as to the user. MD5 can be slightly altered
to accommodate a higher bandwidth data rate. There should be a
predetermined finite number of blocks processed from independent
seeds, such that the I-th block is part of the "I mod K"-th chain.
The resulting K digests themselves form a message, which can be MD5-
encoded using a single-block algorithm. This idea was proposed
independently by the author and by Burt Kaliski of RSA.
The goal is to support finite parallelism to provide adequate
bandwidth at current processing rates, without providing arbitrary
power for spoofing. It would require further analysis to ensure that
it provides an adequate level of security.
For current technology and network bandwidth, a minimum of 4-way
parallel chaining would suffice, and 16-way chaining would be
preferable. This would support network bandwidth of 1 Gbps with 4-
way chaining, in CMOS hardware. The chaining parallelism should be a
multiple of 4-way, to generate a complete block of digests (4 words
per digest, 16 words per block). This modification is believed to
achieve the goals of MD5, without the penalties of implementation of
the current MD5 algorithm.
Security Considerations
This entire document addresses a mechanism for providing security in
IPv6. MD5 is the proposed default optional authentication mechanism
for IPv6 traffic. This RFC specifically addresses the concern that
security mechanisms such as MD5 that cannot support high bandwidth
with available hardware will compromise their deployment, and
ultimately, the security of the systems they are intended to
maintain.
The IPv6 requirements document emphasizes that IPv6 implementations
should not compromise performance, compared to IPv4. This is
presumably despite IPv6's increased functionality. "Required
optional" components of IPv6 should be held to this same standard.
MD5 compromises performance, and so its use as a required default
option in IPv6 should be reconsidered.
The use of MD5 as the default to the required authentication option
may compromise security in high-bandwidth systems, because enabling
the option causes performance degradation, defeating its inclusion as
an IPv6 option. As a result, the authentication option may be
disabled entirely.
It is important to the use of authentication in high-performance
systems that an alternative mechanism be available in IPv6 from the
outset. This may require the specification of multiple "required"
authentication algorithms - one that's slower but believed strong,
and one that's faster but may inspire somewhat less confidence.
Conclusions
MD5 cannot be implemented in existing technology at rates in excess
of 256 Mbps in hardware, or 86 Mbps in software. MD5 is a proposed
authentication option in IPv6, a protocol that should support
existing networking technology, which is capable of 130 Mbps UDP.
As a result, MD5 cannot be used to support IP authentication in
existing networks at existing rates. Although MD5 will support
higher bandwidth in the future due to technological advances, these
will be offset by similar advances in networking. If MD5 cannot
support existing network bandwidth using existing technology, it will
not be able to scale as network speeds increase in the future. This
RFC proposes that MD5 be modified to support a 16-way block chaining,
in order to allow existing technology (CMOS hardware) to support
existing networking rates (1 Gbps). It further proposes that
alternatives to MD5 be considered for use in high-speed networks.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Steve Kent at BBN, Burt Kaliski,
Victor Chang, and Steve Burnett at RSA, Ran Atkinson at the NRL, and
the HPCC Division at ISI for reviewing the contents of this document.
Burt independently suggested the block-parallel modification proposed
here.
References
[1] Atkinson, R., "IPv6 Authentication Header", Work in Progress,
Naval Research Lab, February 1995.
[2] DiMarco, J., "Spec Benchmark table, V. 4.12",
<ftp://ftp.cfd.toronto.edu/pub/spectable>.
[3] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC1321, MIT LCS
& RSA Data Security, Inc., April 1992.
[4] Partridge, C., and F. Kastenholz, "Technical Criteria for
Choosing IP The Next Generation (IPng)", RFC 1726, BBN Systems
and Technologies, FTP Software, December 1994.
[5] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol - DARPA Internet Program Protocol
Specification," STD 5, RFC 791, USC/Information Sciences
Institute, September 1981.
[6] Touch, J., "Performance Analysis fo MD5," to appear in ACM
Sigcomm '95, Boston.
[7] Touch, J., Optimized MD5 software, <ftp://ftp.isi.edu/pub/hpcc-
papers/touch/md5-opt.tar>.
Author's Address
Joe Touch
Information Sciences Institute
University of Southern California
4676 Admiralty Way
Marina del Rey, CA 90292-6695
USA
Phone: +1 310-822-1511 x151
Fax: +1 310-823-6714
URL: ftp://ftp.isi.edu/pub/hpcc-papers/touch
EMail: touch@isi.edu
ISO Plain Language
On this page
§1Why the Speed Matters
MD5 is an authentication algorithm that has been proposed as one authentication option in IPv6. RFC 1321 describes the MD5 algorithm and gives a reference implementation. When enabled, the MD5 algorithm operates over the entire data packet, including the header, with dummy values for the volatile fields.
The RFC addresses how fast MD5 can be implemented in software and hardware, and whether it supports the currently available IP bandwidth. It frames the question as the general issue of checksumming and security at high speed in IPv6. IPv6 has no header checksum, which IPv4 has, but proposes an authentication digest over the entire body of the packet, including the header where volatile fields are zeroed. The performance of that mechanism is what the report examines.
If a security check on incoming packets takes longer than the packets arrive, the router cannot keep up with the data. This report asks whether MD5 would cause that.
§2Measured Performance
The code measured was an optimized version of the MD5 reference implementation from RFC 1321, and the results come from the performance test md5 -t, modified to prohibit on-chip caching of the data block. The measured rates were 87 Mbps on a DEC Alpha at 190 MHz, 33 Mbps on an HP 9000/720, 48 Mbps on an IBM RS/6000 7006 with a PPC 601 at 80 MHz, 31 Mbps on an Intel i486/66 running NetBSD, 44 Mbps on an Intel Pentium/90 running NeXTStep, 52 Mbps on an SGI IP-20 running IRIX 5.2, 37 Mbps on a Sun SPARC-10/51 and SPARC-20/50 running SunOS 4.1.3, and 57 Mbps on a Sun SPARC-20/71 running SunOS 4.1.3.
The report says these rates do not keep up with the currently available IP bandwidth, for example 100 Mbps TCP and 130 Mbps UDP over a Fore SBA-200 ATM host interface in a Sun SPARC-20/71. It also notes that values as high as 100 Mbps have been reported for the DEC Alpha, but that those reflect on-chip caching of the data, and that it is not clear whether in-memory off-chip cache or on-chip cache performance measures are more relevant to IP performance.
Testing shows MD5 running between 31 and 87 million bits per second on the fastest computers of the time, while the networks around them were already carrying 100 to 130 million bits per second.
| Machine | MD5 rate |
|---|---|
| DEC Alpha (190 MHz) | 87 Mbps |
| Sun SPARC-20/71 | 57 Mbps |
| SGI IP-20 | 52 Mbps |
| IBM RS/6000 | 48 Mbps |
| Intel Pentium/90 | 44 Mbps |
| Sun SPARC-10 | 37 Mbps |
| HP 9000/720 | 33 Mbps |
| Intel i486/66 | 31 Mbps |
| TCP on the network | 100 Mbps |
| UDP over ATM on the network | 130 Mbps |
§3Why MD5 Cannot Go Faster
| Approach | Rate |
|---|---|
| MD5 in software, no parallelism | 1 Mbps for each MIPS |
| MD5 in software, with parallelism | 1.6 Mbps for each MIPS |
| MD5 in CMOS hardware | 256 Mbps |
| IPv4 header checksum in a low-cost PLD | More than 1 Gbps |
The MD5 algorithm is a block-chained hashing algorithm. The first block is hashed with an initial seed, and the resulting hash is summed with the seed to become the seed for the next block. When the last block is computed, its next-seed value becomes the hash for the whole stream. The seed for a block therefore depends on both the hash and the seed of the block before it, and as a result blocks cannot be hashed in parallel.
Each 16-word, that is 64-byte, block is hashed in 64 basic steps using a 4-word intermediate hash, which is collapsed at the end, and the 64 steps are 16 groups of 4 steps, one step per intermediate hash word. Each step is composed of two table lookups, one rotation, a 3-component logical operation and 4 additions. The best parallelisation possible leaves the logical function to the last step, and the resulting tree shows that sequences of the binary operation tree cannot be overlapped while the optimised hardware tree can, by one time step. The binary tree takes 5 time units per step of the algorithm and permits at best 3-way parallelism, which in software means 20 instructions per word of input.
From this the report derives two software rates. A computer capable of M MIPS can support a data bandwidth of M/20 * 32 Mbps, that is 1.6 times its MIPS rate, so a 100 MIPS machine can support a 160 Mbps stream, provided register reads and writes overlap entirely with computation. Without any parallelism there are 8 operations per step and 4 steps per word, so 32 operations per word and the data rate equals the MIPS rate. Measured results on eight machines are compared against predictions made from SpecInt92 numbers as MIPS estimators.
The hardware rate takes 3 time units per step, that is 12 time units per word of input. Hardware that can do an operation such as a 32-bit addition in N nanoseconds supports a data bandwidth of 32/12/N bits per second. For CMOS, an operation including register retrieval and storage costs about 5.2 ns, and with 6 clocks through the most highly parallelised implementation that gives 31.2 ns per 32-bit word, or 256 Mbps. The report notes that this will not keep pace with existing hardware, which is capable of link speeds in excess of 622 Mbps for ATM. By comparison, IPv4 uses the Internet checksum, which can be performed in 32-bit-wide units in excess of 1 Gbps in an existing low-cost PLD, and can also be parallelised by computing partial sums and reducing the result.
MD5 works step by step in a chain where each step must wait for the previous one to finish, so the blocks of a packet cannot be hashed at the same time. That is the reason it cannot be sped up much.
- Block chainingEach block depends on the block before it, so blocks cannot be hashed in parallel.
- 64 steps per blockEach 64-byte block is hashed in 64 basic steps, in 16 groups of 4.
- 5 time units per stepThe binary operation tree gives 20 instructions per word of input in software.
- 3-way parallelismThat is the most the binary operation tree allows at any one time.
- 3 time units per step in hardwareThat is 12 time units per word of input, which gives 256 Mbps in CMOS.
§4The Proposed Modification
The report considers two ways to raise the performance of the IPv6 authentication mechanism: increasing the hardware performance of MD5 by slightly modifying the algorithm, or proposing a replacement algorithm. It discusses the modification briefly, and notes that alternate algorithms capable of 3.5 times the speed of MD5 have been discussed elsewhere.
MD5 uses block chaining to ensure sensitivity to block order, and block chaining also prevents arbitrary parallelism, which can be as much a benefit to a spoofer as to the user. MD5 can be slightly altered so that a predetermined finite number of blocks are processed from independent seeds, such that the I-th block is part of the I mod K-th chain. The resulting K digests themselves form a message, which can be MD5-encoded using a single-block algorithm. The report says this idea was proposed independently by the author and by Burt Kaliski of RSA.
The goal is to support finite parallelism, to provide adequate bandwidth at current processing rates, without providing arbitrary power for spoofing. The report says it would require further analysis to ensure an adequate level of security. For current technology and network bandwidth, a minimum of 4-way parallel chaining would suffice and 16-way chaining would be preferable, which would support network bandwidth of 1 Gbps with 4-way chaining in CMOS hardware. The chaining parallelism should be a multiple of 4-way, to generate a complete block of digests, since there are 4 words per digest and 16 words per block.
Split the data into a fixed number of chains and hash them side by side instead of one after another. Sixteen chains would let existing hardware handle a gigabit per second.
§5Security Considerations
The whole document addresses a mechanism for providing security in IPv6, and MD5 is the proposed default optional authentication mechanism for IPv6 traffic. The report says its concern is that security mechanisms such as MD5 that cannot support high bandwidth with available hardware will compromise their deployment, and ultimately the security of the systems they are meant to maintain.
The IPv6 requirements document emphasises that IPv6 implementations should not compromise performance compared to IPv4, presumably despite IPv6's increased functionality, and that required optional components of IPv6 should be held to the same standard. The report says MD5 compromises performance, and so its use as a required default option in IPv6 should be reconsidered. Using MD5 as the default for the required authentication option may compromise security in high-bandwidth systems, because enabling the option causes performance degradation, which defeats its inclusion as an IPv6 option, and as a result the authentication option may be disabled entirely.
It concludes that it is important for the use of authentication in high-performance systems that an alternative mechanism be available in IPv6 from the outset. This may require the specification of multiple required authentication algorithms, one slower but believed strong, and one faster but inspiring somewhat less confidence. The conclusions repeat the numbers: MD5 cannot be implemented in existing technology at rates in excess of 256 Mbps in hardware, or 86 Mbps in software, so it cannot be used to support IP authentication in existing networks at existing rates, and although MD5 will support higher bandwidth in the future through technological advances, those will be offset by similar advances in networking.
The report's conclusion is that making a slow security check part of every packet may make people turn it off altogether, which is worse than having nothing. It asks for a faster alternative to be available from the start.