OPES Callout Reqs: Requirements for Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES) Callout Protocols
What a protocol must do to let a network device hand application messages to a remote server for processing
Beck, A., Hofmann, M., Orman, H., Penno, R., and A. Terzis, "Requirements for Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES) Callout Protocols", RFC 3836, DOI 10.17487/RFC3836, August 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3836>.
@misc{rfc3836,
series = {Request for Comments},
number = 3836,
howpublished = {RFC 3836},
publisher = {RFC Editor},
doi = {10.17487/RFC3836},
url = {https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3836},
author = {A. Beck and M. Hofmann and H. Orman and R. Penno and A. Terzis},
title = {{Requirements for Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES) Callout Protocols}},
pagetotal = 13,
year = 2004,
month = aug,
} RFC text
Contents
Network Working Group A. Beck
Request for Comments: 3836 M. Hofmann
Category: Informational Lucent Technologies
H. Orman
Purple Streak Development
R. Penno
Nortel Networks
A. Terzis
Johns Hopkins University
August 2004
Requirements for Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES)
Callout Protocols
Status of this Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).
Abstract
This document specifies the requirements that the OPES (Open
Pluggable Edge Services) callout protocol must satisfy in order to
support the remote execution of OPES services. The requirements are
intended to help evaluate possible protocol candidates, as well as to
guide the development of such protocols.
Table of Contents
1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Congestion Avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.3. Callout Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.4. Callout Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.5. Asynchronous Message Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.6. Message Segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.7. Support for Keep-Alive Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.8. Operation in NAT Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.9. Multiple Callout Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.10. Multiple OPES Processors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.11. Support for Different Application Protocols . . . . . . 7
3.12. Capability and Parameter Negotiations . . . . . . . . . 7
3.13. Meta Data and Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Performance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Protocol Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Authentication, Confidentiality, and Integrity . . . . 9
5.2. Hop-by-Hop Confidentiality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3. Operation Across Untrusted Domains. . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.4. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. Normative References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Informative References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. Authors' Addresses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. Full Copyright Statement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [2].
2. Introduction
The Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES) architecture [1] enables
cooperative application services (OPES services) between a data
provider, a data consumer, and zero or more OPES processors. The
application services under consideration analyze, and possibly
transform, application-level messages exchanged between the data
provider and the data consumer.
The execution of such services is governed by a set of rules
installed on the OPES processor. The enforcement of rules can
trigger the execution of service applications local to the OPES
processor. Alternatively, the OPES processor can distribute the
responsibility of service execution by communicating and
collaborating with one or more remote callout servers. As described
in [1], an OPES processor communicates with and invokes services on a
callout server by using a callout protocol. This document presents
the requirements for such a protocol.
The requirements in this document are divided into three categories -
functional requirements, performance requirements, and security
requirements. Each requirement is presented as one or more
statements, followed by brief explanatory material as appropriate.
3. Functional Requirements
3.1. Reliability
The OPES callout protocol MUST be able to provide ordered reliability
for the communication between an OPES processor and callout server.
Additionally, the callout protocol SHOULD be able to provide
unordered reliability.
In order to satisfy the reliability requirements, the callout
protocol SHOULD specify that it must be used with a transport
protocol that provides ordered/unordered reliability at the
transport-layer, for example TCP [6] or SCTP [7].
3.2. Congestion Avoidance
The OPES callout protocol MUST ensure that congestion avoidance
matching the standard of RFC 2914 [4] is applied on all communication
between the OPES processor and callout server. For this purpose, the
callout protocol SHOULD use a congestion-controlled transport-layer
protocol, presumably either TCP [6] or SCTP [7].
3.3. Callout Transactions
The OPES callout protocol MUST enable an OPES processor and a callout
server to perform callout transactions with the purpose of exchanging
partial or complete application-level protocol messages (or
modifications thereof). More specifically, the callout protocol MUST
enable an OPES processor to forward a partial or complete application
message to a callout server so that one or more OPES services can
process the forwarded application message (or parts thereof). The
result of the service operation may be a modified application
message. The callout protocol MUST therefore enable the callout
server to return a modified application message or the modified parts
of an application message to the OPES processor. Additionally, the
callout protocol MUST enable a callout server to report the result of
a callout transaction (e.g., in the form of a status code) back to
the OPES processor.
A callout transaction is defined as a message exchange between an
OPES processor and a callout server consisting of a callout request
and a callout response. Both, the callout request and the callout
response MAY each consist of one or more callout protocol messages,
i.e. a series of protocol messages. A callout request MUST always
contain a partial or complete application message. A callout
response MUST always indicate the result of the callout transaction.
A callout response MAY contain a modified application message.
Callout transactions are always initiated by a callout request from
an OPES processor and are typically terminated by a callout response
from a callout server. The OPES callout protocol MUST, however, also
provide a mechanism that allows either endpoint of a callout
transaction to terminate a callout transaction before a callout
request or response has been completely received by the corresponding
callout endpoint. Such a mechanism MUST ensure that a premature
termination of a callout transaction does not result in the loss of
application message data.
A premature termination of a callout transaction is required to
support OPES services, which may terminate even before they have
processed the entire application message. Content analysis services,
for example, may be able to classify a Web object after having
processed just the first few bytes of a Web object.
3.4. Callout Connections
The OPES callout protocol MUST enable an OPES processor and a callout
server to perform multiple callout transactions over a callout
connection. Additionally, the callout protocol MUST provide a method
of associating callout transactions with callout connections. A
callout connection is defined as a logical connection at the
application-layer between an OPES processor and a callout server. A
callout connection MAY have certain parameters associated with it,
for example parameters that control the fail-over behavior of
connection endpoints. Callout connection-specific parameters MAY be
negotiated between OPES processors and callout servers (see Section
3.12).
The OPES callout protocol MAY choose to multiplex multiple callout
connections over a single transport-layer connection if a flow
control mechanism that guarantees fairness among multiplexed callout
connections is applied.
Callout connections MUST always be initiated by an OPES processor. A
callout connection MAY be closed by either endpoint of the
connection, provided that doing so does not affect the normal
operation of on-going callout transactions associated with the
callout connection.
3.5. Asynchronous Message Exchange
The OPES callout protocol MUST support an asynchronous message
exchange over callout connections.
In order to allow asynchronous processing on the OPES processor and
callout server, it MUST be possible to separate request issuance from
response processing. The protocol MUST therefore allow multiple
outstanding callout requests and provide a method of correlating
callout responses with callout requests.
Additionally, the callout protocol MUST enable a callout server to
respond to a callout request before it has received the entire
request.
3.6. Message Segmentation
The OPES callout protocol MUST allow an OPES processor to forward an
application message to a callout server in a series of smaller
message fragments. The callout protocol MUST further enable the
receiving callout server to re-assemble the fragmented application
message.
Likewise, the callout protocol MUST enable a callout server to return
an application message to an OPES processor in a series of smaller
message fragments. The callout protocol MUST enable the receiving
OPES processor to re-assemble the fragmented application message.
Depending on the application-layer protocol used on the data path,
application messages may be very large in size (for example in the
case of audio/video streams) or of unknown size. In both cases, the
OPES processor has to initiate a callout transaction before it has
received the entire application message to avoid long delays for the
data consumer. The OPES processor MUST therefore be able to forward
fragments or chunks of an application message to a callout server as
it receives them from the data provider or consumer. Likewise, the
callout server MUST be able to process and return application message
fragments as it receives them from the OPES processor.
Application message segmentation is also required if the OPES callout
protocol provides a flow control mechanism in order to multiplex
multiple callout connections over a single transport-layer connection
(see Section 3.4).
3.7. Support for Keep-Alive Mechanism
The OPES callout protocol MUST provide a keep-alive mechanism which,
if used, would allow both endpoints of a callout connection to detect
a failure of the other endpoint, even in the absence of callout
transactions. The callout protocol MAY specify that keep-alive
messages be exchanged over existing callout connections or a separate
connection between OPES processor and callout server. The callout
protocol MAY also specify that the use of the keep-alive mechanism is
optional.
The detection of a callout server failure may enable an OPES
processor to establish a callout connection with a stand-by callout
server so that future callout transactions do not result in the loss
of application message data. The detection of the failure of an OPES
processor may enable a callout server to release resources which
would otherwise not be available for callout transactions with other
OPES processors.
3.8. Operation in NAT Environments
The OPES protocol SHOULD be NAT-friendly, i.e., its operation should
not be compromised by the presence of one or more NAT devices in the
path between an OPES processor and a callout server.
3.9. Multiple Callout Servers
The OPES callout protocol MUST allow an OPES processor to
simultaneously communicate with more than one callout server.
In larger networks, OPES services are likely to be hosted by
different callout servers. Therefore, an OPES processor will likely
have to communicate with multiple callout servers. The protocol
design MUST enable an OPES processor to do so.
3.10. Multiple OPES Processors
The OPES callout protocol MUST allow a callout server to
simultaneously communicate with more than one OPES processor.
The protocol design MUST support a scenario in which multiple OPES
processors use the services of a single callout server.
3.11. Support for Different Application Protocols
The OPES callout protocol SHOULD be application protocol-agnostic,
i.e., it SHOULD not make any assumptions about the characteristics of
the application-layer protocol used on the data path between the data
provider and data consumer. At a minimum, the callout protocol MUST
be compatible with HTTP [5].
The OPES entities on the data path may use different application-
layer protocols, including, but not limited to, HTTP [5] and RTP [8].
It would be desirable to be able to use the same OPES callout
protocol for any such application-layer protocol.
3.12. Capability and Parameter Negotiations
The OPES callout protocol MUST support the negotiation of
capabilities and callout connection parameters between an OPES
processor and a callout server. This implies that the OPES processor
and the callout server MUST be able to exchange their capabilities
and preferences. Then they MUST be able to engage in a deterministic
negotiation process that terminates either with the two endpoints
agreeing on the capabilities and parameters to be used for future
callout connections/transactions or with a determination that their
capabilities are incompatible.
Capabilities and parameters that could be negotiated between an OPES
processor and a callout server include (but are not limited to):
callout protocol version, fail-over behavior, heartbeat rate for
keep-alive messages, security-related parameters, etc.
The callout protocol MUST NOT use negotiation to determine the
transport protocol to be used for callout connections. The callout
protocol MAY, however, specify that a certain application message
protocol (e.g., HTTP [5], RTP [8]) requires the use of a certain
transport protocol (e.g., TCP [6], SCTP [7]).
Callout connection parameters may also pertain to the characteristics
of OPES callout services if, for example, callout connections are
associated with one or more specific OPES services. An OPES
service-specific parameter may, for example, specify which parts of
an application message an OPES service requires for its operation.
Callout connection parameters MUST be negotiated on a per-callout
connection basis and before any callout transactions are performed
over the corresponding callout connection. Other parameters and
capabilities, such as the fail-over behavior, MAY be negotiated
between the two endpoints independently of callout connections.
The parties to a callout protocol MAY use callout connections to
negotiate all or some of their capabilities and parameters.
Alternatively, a separate control connection MAY be used for this
purpose.
3.13. Meta Data and Instructions
The OPES callout protocol MUST provide a mechanism for the endpoints
of a particular callout transaction to include metadata and
instructions for the OPES processor or callout server in callout
requests and responses.
Specifically, the callout protocol MUST enable an OPES processor to
include information about the forwarded application message in a
callout request, e.g. in order to specify the type of forwarded
application message or to specify what part(s) of the application
message are forwarded to the callout server. Likewise, the callout
server MUST be able to include information about the returned
application message.
The OPES processor MUST further be able to include an ordered list of
one or more uniquely specified OPES services which are to be
performed on the forwarded application message in the specified
order. However, as the callout protocol MAY also choose to associate
callout connections with specific OPES services, there may not be a
need to identify OPES services on a per-callout transaction basis.
Additionally, the OPES callout protocol MUST allow the callout server
to indicate to the OPES processor the cacheability of callout
responses. This implies that callout responses may have to carry
cache-control instructions for the OPES processor.
The OPES callout protocol MUST further enable the OPES processor to
indicate to the callout server if it has kept a local copy of the
forwarded application message (or parts thereof). This information
enables the callout server to determine whether the forwarded
application message must be returned to the OPES processor, even if
it has not been modified by an OPES service.
The OPES callout protocol MUST also allow OPES processors to comply
with the tracing requirements of the OPES architecture as laid out in
[1] and [3]. This implies that the callout protocol MUST enable a
callout server to convey to the OPES processor information about the
OPES service operations performed on the forwarded application
message.
4. Performance Requirements
4.1. Protocol Efficiency
The OPES callout protocol SHOULD have minimal latency. For example,
the size and complexity of its headers could be minimized.
Because OPES callout transactions add latency to application protocol
transactions on the data path, callout protocol efficiency is crucial
to overall performance.
5. Security Requirements
In the absence of any security mechanisms, sensitive information
might be communicated between the OPES processor and the callout
server in violation of either endpoint's security and privacy policy,
through misconfiguration or deliberate insider attack. By using
strong authentication, message encryption, and integrity checks, this
threat can be minimized to a smaller set of insiders and/or operator
configuration errors.
The OPES processor and the callout servers SHOULD have enforceable
policies that limit the parties they communicate with and that
determine the protections to use based on identities of the endpoints
and other data (such as enduser policies). In order to enforce the
policies, they MUST be able to authenticate the callout protocol
endpoints using cryptographic methods.
5.1. Authentication, Confidentiality, and Integrity
The parties to the callout protocol MUST have a sound basis for
binding authenticated identities to the protocol endpoints, and they
MUST verify that these identities are consistent with their security
policies.
The OPES callout protocol MUST provide for message authentication,
confidentiality, and integrity between the OPES processor and the
callout server. It MUST provide mutual authentication. For this
purpose, the callout protocol SHOULD use existing security
mechanisms. The callout protocol specification is not required to
specify the security mechanisms, but it MAY instead refer to a
lower-level security protocol and discuss how its mechanisms are to
be used with the callout protocol.
5.2. Hop-by-Hop Confidentiality
If hop-by-hop encryption is a requirement for the content path, then
this confidentiality MUST be extended to the communication between
the OPES processor and the callout server. While it is recommended
that the communication between the OPES processor and callout server
always be encrypted, encryption MAY be optional if both the OPES
processor and the callout server are co-located together in a single
administrative domain with strong confidentiality guarantees.
In order to minimize data exposure, the callout protocol MUST use a
different encryption key for each encrypted content stream.
5.3. Operation Across Untrusted Domains
The OPES callout protocol MUST operate securely across untrusted
domains between the OPES processor and the callout server.
If the communication channels between the OPES processor and callout
server cross outside of the organization which is responsible for the
OPES services, then endpoint authentication and message protection
(confidentiality and integrity) MUST be used.
5.4. Privacy
Any communication carrying information relevant to privacy policies
MUST protect the data using encryption.
6. Security Considerations
The security requirements for the OPES callout protocol are discussed
in Section 5.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[1] Barbir, A., Penno, R., Chen, R., Hofmann, M., and H. Orman, "An
Architecture for Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES)", RFC 3835,
August 2004.
[2] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[3] Floyd, S. and L. Daigle, "IAB Architectural and Policy
Considerations for Open Pluggable Edge Services", RFC 3238,
January 2002.
[4] Floyd, S. and L. Daigle, "IAB Architectural and Policy
Considerations for Open Pluggable Edge Services", RFC 3238,
January 2002.
[5] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L.,
Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol --
HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
7.2. Informative References
[6] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC 793,
September 1981.
[7] Stewart, R., Xie, Q., Morneault, K., Sharp, C., Schwarzbauer,
H., Taylor, T., Rytina, I., Kalla, M., Zhang, L., and V. Paxson,
"Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 2960, October 2000.
[8] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V. Jacobson,
"RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications", RFC
3550, July 2003.
8. Acknowledgments
Parts of this document are based on previous work by Anca Dracinschi
Sailer, Volker Hilt, and Rama R. Menon.
The authors would like to thank the participants of the OPES WG for
their comments on this document.
9. Authors' Addresses
Andre Beck
Lucent Technologies
101 Crawfords Corner Road
Holmdel, NJ 07733
US
EMail: abeck@bell-labs.com
Markus Hofmann
Lucent Technologies
Room 4F-513
101 Crawfords Corner Road
Holmdel, NJ 07733
US
Phone: +1 732 332 5983
EMail: hofmann@bell-labs.com
Hilarie Orman
Purple Streak Development
EMail: ho@alum.mit.edu
URI: http://www.purplestreak.com
Reinaldo Penno
Nortel Networks
600 Technology Park Drive
Billerica, MA 01821
US
EMail: rpenno@nortelnetworks.com
Andreas Terzis
Computer Science Department
Johns Hopkins University
3400 North Charles Street, 224 NEB
Baltimore, MD 21218
Phone: +1 410 516 5847
EMail: terzis@cs.jhu.edu
10. Full Copyright Statement
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ISO Plain Language
On this page
§2What the Callout Protocol Is For
The Open Pluggable Edge Services architecture enables cooperative application services between a data provider, a data consumer and zero or more OPES processors. The application services under consideration analyse, and possibly transform, application-level messages exchanged between the data provider and the data consumer.
The execution of such services is governed by a set of rules installed on the OPES processor, and enforcing the rules can trigger the execution of service applications local to that processor. Alternatively, the processor can distribute the responsibility of service execution by communicating and collaborating with one or more remote callout servers. An OPES processor communicates with and invokes services on a callout server by using a callout protocol, and this document presents the requirements for such a protocol. The requirements are divided into three categories, functional, performance and security, and each requirement is presented as one or more statements followed by brief explanatory material.
In plain terms: the device on the path can ask a specialist server elsewhere to look at each message, and get back either a changed message or a verdict. This memo says what that conversation has to look like.
- ReliabilityOrdered delivery between processor and server, unordered as well if possible
- Congestion avoidanceThe same congestion control the Internet uses elsewhere, so a callout cannot flood the link
- Callout transactionsA request and a response, either of which may be cut short without losing data
- Callout connectionsMany transactions over one connection, with parameters such as fail-over behaviour
- Asynchronous exchangeMany requests in flight at once, with responses matched to them
- SegmentationBig messages sent in pieces and reassembled at the other end
- Keep-aliveA way to notice the other end has gone, so a stand-by can take over
- NegotiationThe two ends agree versions, fail-over behaviour and security parameters before starting
§3Callout Transactions and Connections
The protocol must provide ordered reliability for the communication between an OPES processor and a callout server, and should also be able to provide unordered reliability. To satisfy that, it should specify that it is used with a transport protocol that provides ordered or unordered reliability at the transport layer, for example TCP or SCTP. It must ensure that congestion avoidance matching the standard of RFC 2914 is applied to all communication between the two, so a congestion-controlled transport such as TCP or SCTP should be used.
It must enable a processor and a callout server to perform callout transactions for the purpose of exchanging partial or complete application-level protocol messages, or modifications of them. The processor must be able to forward a partial or complete application message so that one or more OPES services can process it, and the server must be able to return a modified application message, or the modified parts of one, to the processor. The server must also be able to report the result of the transaction, for example as a status code.
A callout transaction is a message exchange consisting of a callout request and a callout response, and each of those may consist of one or more protocol messages. A request must always contain a partial or complete application message, a response must always indicate the result of the transaction, and a response may contain a modified application message. Transactions are always initiated by a request from the processor and typically terminated by a response from the server, but the protocol must also let either end terminate a transaction before the request or response has been completely received, and that mechanism must ensure that premature termination does not lose application message data. Premature termination is required to support services that finish early, such as content analysis services that may classify a web object after processing just the first few bytes.
The protocol must enable multiple transactions over a callout connection, and must provide a way of associating transactions with connections. A callout connection is a logical application-layer connection between the processor and the server, and it may have parameters associated with it, for example ones controlling the fail-over behaviour of connection endpoints, which may be negotiated between the two. The protocol may multiplex multiple connections over a single transport-layer connection, if a flow control mechanism that guarantees fairness among the multiplexed connections is applied. Connections must always be initiated by the processor, and may be closed by either endpoint provided that doing so does not affect the operation of ongoing transactions on that connection.
The protocol must support asynchronous message exchange, so that request issuance can be separated from response processing, with multiple outstanding requests and a method of correlating responses with requests. It must also enable a callout server to respond to a request before it has received the whole request.
Message segmentation is required in both directions. The processor must be able to forward an application message in a series of smaller fragments and the server must be able to re-assemble them, and the server must be able to return an application message in fragments that the processor re-assembles. Depending on the application protocol on the data path, application messages may be very large, as with audio or video streams, or of unknown size, and in both cases the processor has to start a transaction before it has received the whole message to avoid long delays for the data consumer. So the processor must be able to forward fragments as it receives them, and the server must be able to process and return fragments as it receives them. Segmentation is also required if the protocol provides a flow control mechanism to multiplex multiple connections over one transport connection.
The server has to be able to look at a message while it is still arriving, decide early, and hand back a changed version. That means the protocol has to handle pieces of a message in both directions and reassemble them at the other end.
- CALLOUT REQUESTCarries a partial or complete application message, and may name the services to run on it.
- CALLOUT RESPONSEAlways states the result of the transaction, and may carry the modified application message.
§3.7Staying Alive and Dealing with More Than One Peer
The protocol must provide a keep-alive mechanism which, if used, would allow both endpoints of a connection to detect a failure of the other endpoint even in the absence of callout transactions. It may specify that keep-alive messages are exchanged over existing callout connections or over a separate connection, and may specify that the use of the mechanism is optional. Detecting a callout server failure may let the processor establish a connection with a stand-by server so that future transactions do not lose application message data, and detecting a processor failure may let the server release resources that would otherwise not be available for transactions with other processors.
The protocol should be NAT-friendly, meaning its operation should not be compromised by the presence of NAT devices in the path between the processor and the server.
The protocol must allow a processor to communicate simultaneously with more than one callout server, because in larger networks OPES services are likely to be hosted by different callout servers, so a processor will likely have to talk to several. It must also allow a callout server to communicate simultaneously with more than one OPES processor, and the design must support a scenario in which several processors use the services of one server.
The protocol should be application protocol agnostic, making no assumptions about the application-layer protocol used on the data path between the data provider and the consumer, and at a minimum it must be compatible with HTTP. The OPES entities on the data path may use different application-layer protocols, including HTTP and RTP, and it would be desirable to use the same callout protocol for any such protocol.
There has to be a way to notice that the other end has gone, so a stand-by can take over, and the protocol has to cope with several servers and several processors at once. It also has to work when a NAT box sits in between.
§3.12Negotiating Capabilities and Carrying Metadata
The protocol must support the negotiation of capabilities and callout connection parameters between the processor and the callout server. The two must be able to exchange their capabilities and preferences, and then to engage in a deterministic negotiation process that ends either with the endpoints agreeing on the capabilities and parameters to be used for future connections and transactions, or with a determination that their capabilities are incompatible. The things that could be negotiated include the callout protocol version, fail-over behaviour, the heartbeat rate for keep-alive messages and security related parameters. The protocol must not use negotiation to determine the transport protocol used for connections, though it may specify that a certain application message protocol, such as HTTP or RTP, requires a certain transport protocol.
Connection parameters may also pertain to the characteristics of the OPES services themselves, for example when a connection is associated with specific services: a service-specific parameter may specify which parts of an application message the service needs. Connection parameters must be negotiated per connection and before any transactions are performed over it, while other parameters and capabilities, such as fail-over behaviour, may be negotiated independently of connections. The parties may negotiate over the callout connections themselves, or a separate control connection may be used for the purpose.
The protocol must provide a mechanism for the endpoints of a transaction to include metadata and instructions in the request and the response. The processor must be able to include information about the forwarded application message, for instance to specify the type of message or which parts of it are being forwarded, and the server must be able to include information about the message it returns. The processor must further be able to include an ordered list of one or more uniquely specified OPES services to be performed on the forwarded message in the specified order, though if the protocol associates connections with specific services there may be no need to identify services per transaction.
The protocol must allow the server to indicate to the processor the cacheability of callout responses, so responses may have to carry cache-control instructions, and it must enable the processor to tell the server whether it has kept a local copy of the forwarded message, which lets the server decide whether the message must be returned even if no service changed it. The protocol must also allow processors to comply with the tracing requirements of the OPES architecture, which means the server must be able to convey information about the service operations it performed on the forwarded message.
Before any work starts, the two ends agree what they can each do and how they should fail over. Along with each request come notes about what the message is, which services should run on it, and whether the answer may be cached.
§4Efficiency
The callout protocol should have minimal latency, and the size and complexity of its headers could be minimised as one way of achieving that. Because callout transactions add latency to the application protocol transactions on the data path, the efficiency of the callout protocol is crucial to the overall performance of the data path. A user waiting on a web page does not wait only for the network to carry the page, but for the callout exchange in the middle of it as well.
The memo's own security considerations section adds nothing further: it simply points at the security requirements set out in the previous section.
Every callout costs time, and the user is waiting, so the protocol should add as little delay as possible and keep its headers small.
§5Security Requirements
In the absence of any security mechanisms, sensitive information might be communicated between the OPES processor and the callout server in violation of either endpoint's security and privacy policy, through misconfiguration or deliberate insider attack. By using strong authentication, message encryption and integrity checks, this threat can be minimised to a smaller set of insiders and operator configuration errors. The processor and the callout servers should have enforceable policies that limit the parties they communicate with and determine the protections to use based on the identities of the endpoints and other data such as end user policies, and to enforce those policies they must be able to authenticate the callout protocol endpoints using cryptographic methods.
The parties to the callout protocol must have a sound basis for binding authenticated identities to the protocol endpoints, and must verify that these identities are consistent with their security policies. The protocol must provide for message authentication, confidentiality and integrity between the processor and the server, and it must provide mutual authentication. It should use existing security mechanisms; the callout protocol specification is not required to specify them, but may refer to a lower-level security protocol and discuss how its mechanisms are to be used.
If hop-by-hop encryption is a requirement for the content path, that confidentiality must be extended to the communication between the processor and the server. Although it is recommended that this communication always be encrypted, it may be optional if the processor and the server are co-located in a single administrative domain with strong confidentiality guarantees. To minimise data exposure, the callout protocol must use a different encryption key for each encrypted content stream.
The protocol must operate securely across untrusted domains between the processor and the server: if the communication channels cross outside the organisation responsible for the OPES services, then endpoint authentication and message protection for confidentiality and integrity must be used. Finally, any communication carrying information relevant to privacy policies must protect the data using encryption.
The two ends must prove who they are to each other, and the content must be scrambled on the way, especially when the call leaves the organisation that runs the service. Each encrypted stream gets its own key, so a leak of one does not expose the others.