RSVP Cryptographic Authentication -- Updated Message Type Value
Renumbers two RSVP Integrity messages to resolve a conflict with the Bundle message.
Braden, R. and L. Zhang, "RSVP Cryptographic Authentication -- Updated Message Type Value", RFC 3097, DOI 10.17487/RFC3097, April 2001, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3097>.
@misc{rfc3097,
series = {Request for Comments},
number = 3097,
howpublished = {RFC 3097},
publisher = {RFC Editor},
doi = {10.17487/RFC3097},
url = {https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3097},
author = {R. Braden and L. Zhang},
title = {{RSVP Cryptographic Authentication -- Updated Message Type Value}},
pagetotal = 4,
year = 2001,
month = apr,
} RFC text
Contents
Network Working Group R. Braden
Request for Comments: 3097 ISI
Updates: 2747 L. Zhang
Category: Standards Track UCLA
April 2001
RSVP Cryptographic Authentication --
Updated Message Type Value
Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This memo resolves a duplication in the assignment of RSVP Message
Types, by changing the Message Types assigned by RFC 2747 to
Challenge and Integrity Response messages.
1. Introduction
RFC 2747 ("RSVP Cryptographic Authentication") [RFC2747] assigns RSVP
Message Type 12 to an Integrity Response message, while RFC 2961
("RSVP Refresh Overhead Reduction Extensions") [RFC2961] assigns the
same value to a Bundle message. This memo resolves the conflict over
RSVP Message Type 12 by assigning a different value to the Message
Type of the Integrity Response Message in RFC 2747. It is believed
that the protocol defined by RFC 2961 entered use in the field before
the RFC's publication and before the conflicting Message Type was
noticed, and that it may be easier to install new software in
environments that have deployed the Integrity object than in those
that have deployed the refresh reduction extension.
To simplify possible interoperability problems caused by this change,
we also assign a new value to the Message Type of RFC 2747's
Challenge message, to which the Integrity Response message is a
reply.
2. Modification
Message Types defined in the RSVP Integrity extension [RFC 2747]
shall be changed as follows:
o Challenge message has Message Type 25.
o Integrity Response message has Message Type 25+1.
3. Compatibility
Two communicating nodes whose Integrity implementations are
conformant with this modification will interoperate, using Message
Type 12 for Bundle messages and Message Types 25 and 26 for the
Integrity handshake. A non-conformant implementation of the
Integrity extension will not interoperate with a conformant
implementation (though two non-conformant implementations can
interoperate as before).
There is no possibility of an Integrity handshake succeeding
accidentally due to this change, since both sides of the handshake
use the new numbers or the old numbers. Furthermore, the Integrity
Response message includes a 32-bit cookie that must match a cookie in
the Challenge message, else the challenge will fail. Finally, a
non-conformant implementation should never receive a Bundle message
that it interprets as an Integrity Response message, since RFC 2961
requires that Bundle messages be sent only to a Bundle-capable node.
4. References
[RFC2747] Baker, F., Lindell, R. and M. Talwar, "RSVP Cryptographic
Authentication", RFC 2747, January 2000.
[RFC2961] Berger, L., Gan, D., Swallow, G., Pan, P., Tommasi, F.
and S. Molendini, "RSVP Refresh Overhead Reduction
Extensions", RFC 2961, April 2001.
Security Considerations
No new security considerations are introduced beyond RFC 2747 itself
and the compatibility issues above.
Authors' Addresses
Bob Braden
USC Information Sciences Institute
4676 Admiralty Way
Marina del Rey, CA 90292
Phone: (310) 822-1511
EMail: Braden@ISI.EDU
Lixia Zhang
UCLA Computer Science Department
4531G Boelter Hall
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1596 USA
Phone: 310-825-2695
EMail: lixia@cs.ucla.edu
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
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included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
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Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
ISO Plain Language
On this page
§1A Duplicate Message Type
RFC 2747 assigns message type 12 to the Integrity Response. RFC 2961 assigns the same value to a Bundle message.
This memo says the refresh-reduction protocol was believed to have entered use before the conflict was noticed. It changes both Integrity message types to reduce possible interoperability problems.
Two different RSVP messages used the same number. The memo changes the Integrity handshake numbers to remove that conflict.
§2New Challenge and Response Values
The Challenge message now has Message Type 25. The Integrity Response message now has Message Type 25+1, which is 26.
Changing the Challenge as well as its reply keeps the two messages identified as a matched handshake under the new assignments.
The Challenge uses type 25, and the Integrity Response uses type 26. Both messages receive new numbers as part of the fix.
| Message | Type |
|---|---|
| Bundle | 12 |
| Challenge THIS RFC | 25 |
| Integrity Response THIS RFC | 26 |
§3Compatibility Between Implementations
Two nodes that follow this change interoperate using type 12 for Bundle and types 25 and 26 for the Integrity handshake. A node that does not follow the change will not interoperate with one that does, although two older implementations can still interoperate as before.
The Integrity Response includes a 32-bit cookie that must match the Challenge. The memo says this prevents the handshake from succeeding accidentally because of the changed message numbers.
Updated nodes use the new numbers together, while older nodes keep the old assignments. The response must also carry a cookie matching the Challenge.