OSPF LLS: OSPF Link-Local Signaling
A way for routers on the same link to pass extra information to each other.
Zinin, A., Roy, A., Nguyen, L., Friedman, B., and D. Yeung, "OSPF Link-Local Signaling", RFC 5613, DOI 10.17487/RFC5613, August 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5613>.
@misc{rfc5613,
series = {Request for Comments},
number = 5613,
howpublished = {RFC 5613},
publisher = {RFC Editor},
doi = {10.17487/RFC5613},
url = {https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5613},
author = {A. Zinin and A. Roy and L. Nguyen and B. Friedman and D. Yeung},
title = {{OSPF Link-Local Signaling}},
pagetotal = 12,
year = 2009,
month = aug,
} RFC text
Contents
Network Working Group A. Zinin
Request for Comments: 5613 Alcatel-Lucent
Obsoletes: 4813 A. Roy
Category: Standards Track L. Nguyen
Cisco Systems
B. Friedman
Google, Inc.
D. Yeung
Cisco Systems
August 2009
OSPF Link-Local Signaling
Abstract
OSPF is a link-state intra-domain routing protocol. OSPF routers
exchange information on a link using packets that follow a well-
defined fixed format. The format is not flexible enough to enable
new features that need to exchange arbitrary data. This document
describes a backward-compatible technique to perform link-local
signaling, i.e., exchange arbitrary data on a link. This document
replaces the experimental specification published in RFC 4813 to
bring it on the Standards Track.
Status of This Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Proposed Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. L-Bit in Options Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. LLS Data Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. LLS TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4. Extended Options and Flags TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.5. Cryptographic Authentication TLV (OSPFv2 ONLY) . . . . . . 6
2.6. Private TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Compatibility Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix B. Changes from RFC 4813 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
This document describes an extension to OSPFv2 [OSPFV2] and OSPFv3
[OSPFV3] allowing additional information to be exchanged between
routers on the same link. OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 packet formats are fixed
and do not allow for extension. This document proposes appending an
optional data block composed of Type/Length/Value (TLV) triplets to
existing OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 packets to carry this additional
information. Throughout this document, OSPF will be used when the
specification is applicable to both OSPFv2 and OSPFv3. Similarly,
OSPFv2 or OSPFv3 will be used when the text is protocol specific.
One potential way of solving this task could be introducing a new
packet type. However, that would mean introducing extra packets on
the network that may not be desirable and may cause backward
compatibility issues. This document describes how to exchange data
using standard OSPF packet types.
1.1. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [KEY].
2. Proposed Solution
To perform link-local signaling (LLS), OSPF routers add a special
data block to the end of OSPF packets or right after the
authentication data block when cryptographic authentication is used.
The length of the LLS block is not included into the length of the
OSPF packet, but is included in the IPv4/IPv6 packet length. Figure
1 illustrates how the LLS data block is attached.
+---------------------+ -- -- +---------------------+
| IP Header | ^ ^ | IPv6 Header |
| Length = HL+X+Y+Z | | Header Length | | Length = HL+X+Y |
| | v v | |
+---------------------+ -- -- +---------------------+
| OSPF Header | ^ ^ | OSPFv3 Header |
| Length = X | | | | Length = X |
|.....................| | X | X |.....................|
| | | | | |
| OSPFv2 Data | | | | OSPFv3 Data |
| | v v | |
+---------------------+ -- -- +---------------------+
| | ^ ^ | |
| Authentication Data | | Y | Y | LLS Data |
| | v v | |
+---------------------+ -- -- +---------------------+
| | ^
| LLS Data | | Z
| | v
+---------------------+ --
Figure 1: LLS Data Block in OSPFv2 and OSPFv3
The LLS block MAY be attached to OSPF Hello and Database Description
(DD) packets. The LLS block MUST NOT be attached to any other OSPF
packet types on generation and MUST be ignored on reception.
The data included in the LLS block attached to a Hello packet MAY be
used for dynamic signaling since Hello packets may be sent at any
time. However, delivery of LLS data in Hello packets is not
guaranteed. The data sent with DD packets is guaranteed to be
delivered as part of the adjacency forming process.
This document does not specify how the data transmitted by the LLS
mechanism should be interpreted by OSPF routers. As routers that do
not understand LLS may receive these packets, changes made due to LLS
block TLV's do not affect the basic routing when interacting with
non-LLS routers.
2.1. L-Bit in Options Field
A new L-bit (L stands for LLS) is introduced into the OSPF Options
field (see Figures 2a and 2b). Routers set the L-bit in Hello and DD
packets to indicate that the packet contains an LLS data block. In
other words, the LLS data block is only examined if the L-bit is set.
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| * | O | DC| L |N/P| MC| E | * |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+-+
Figure 2a: OSPFv2 Options Field
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |L|AF|*|*|DC| R| N|MC| E|V6|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+--+--+--+--+--+--+
Figure 2b: OSPFv3 Options Field
The L-bit MUST NOT be set except in Hello and DD packets that contain
an LLS block.
2.2. LLS Data Block
The data block used for link-local signaling is formatted as
described below (see Figure 3 for illustration).
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Checksum | LLS Data Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| LLS TLVs |
. .
. .
. .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: Format of LLS Data Block
The Checksum field contains the standard IP checksum for the entire
contents of the LLS block. Before computing the checksum, the
checksum field is set to 0. If the checksum is incorrect, the OSPF
packet MUST be processed, but the LLS block MUST be discarded.
The 16-bit LLS Data Length field contains the length (in 32-bit
words) of the LLS block including the header and payload.
Note that if the OSPF packet is cryptographically authenticated, the
LLS data block MUST also be cryptographically authenticated. In this
case, the regular LLS checksum is not calculated, but is instead set
to 0.
The rest of the block contains a set of Type/Length/Value (TLV)
triplets as described in Section 2.3. All TLVs MUST be 32-bit
aligned (with padding if necessary).
2.3. LLS TLVs
The contents of an LLS data block are constructed using TLVs. See
Figure 4 for the TLV format.
The Type field contains the TLV ID, which is unique for each type of
TLV. The Length field contains the length of the Value field (in
bytes). The Value field is variable and contains arbitrary data.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. .
. Value .
. .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: Format of LLS TLVs
Note that TLVs are always padded to a 32-bit boundary, but padding
bytes are not included in the TLV Length field (though they are
included in the LLS Data Length field in the LLS block header).
Unrecognized TLV types are ignored.
2.4. Extended Options and Flags TLV
This subsection describes a TLV called the Extended Options and Flags
(EOF) TLV. The format of the EOF-TLV is shown in Figure 5.
Bits in the Value field do not have any semantics from the point of
view of the LLS mechanism. Bits MAY be allocated to announce OSPF
link-local capabilities. Bits MAY also be allocated to perform
boolean link-local signaling.
The length of the Value field in the EOF-TLV is 4 bytes.
The value of the Type field in the EOF-TLV is 1. The EOF-TLV MUST
only appear once in the LLS data block.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 1 | 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Extended Options and Flags |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: Format of the EOF-TLV
Currently, [OOB] and [RESTART] use bits in the Extended Options field
of the EOF-TLV.
The Extended Options and Flags bits are defined in Section 3.
2.5. Cryptographic Authentication TLV (OSPFv2 ONLY)
This document defines a special TLV that is used for cryptographic
authentication (CA-TLV) of the LLS data block. This TLV MUST only be
included in the LLS block when cryptographic authentication is
enabled on the corresponding interface. The message digest of the
LLS block MUST be calculated using the same key and authentication
algorithm as used for the OSPFv2 packet. The cryptographic sequence
number is included in the TLV and MUST be the same as the one in the
OSPFv2 authentication data for the LLS block to be considered
authentic.
The TLV is constructed as shown in Figure 6.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 2 | AuthLen |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. .
. AuthData .
. .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: Format of Cryptographic Authentication TLV
The value of the Type field for the CA-TLV is 2.
The Length field in the header contains the length of the data
portion of the TLV including 4 bytes for Sequence Number and the
length of the message digest block for the whole LLS block in bytes.
The Sequence Number field contains the cryptographic sequence number
that is used to prevent simple replay attacks. For the LLS block to
be considered authentic, the Sequence Number in the CA-TLV MUST match
the Sequence Number in the OSPFv2 packet header Authentication field
(which MUST be present). In the event of Sequence Number mismatch or
Authentication failure, the whole LLS block MUST be ignored.
The CA-TLV MUST NOT appear more than once in the LLS block. Also,
when present, this TLV MUST be the last TLV in the LLS block. If it
appears more than once, only the first occurrence is processed and
any others MUST be ignored.
The AuthData field contains the message digest calculated for the LLS
data block up to the CA-TLV AuthData field (i.e., excludes the CA-TLV
AuthData).
The CA-TLV is not applicable to OSPFv3 and it MUST NOT be added to
any OSPFv3 packet. If found on reception, this TLV MUST be ignored.
2.6. Private TLVs
LLS type values in the range of 32768-65536 are reserved for private
use. The first four octets of the Value field MUST be the private
enterprise code [ENTNUM]. This allows multiple vendor private
extensions to coexist in a network.
3. IANA Considerations
This document uses the registry that was originally created in
[RFC4813]. IANA updated the following registry to point to this
document instead:
o "Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) Link-Local Signalling (LLS) -
Type/Length/Value Identifiers (TLV)"
IANA allocated L-bit in the "OSPFv2 Options Registry" and "OSPFv3
Options Registry" as per Section 2.1.
LLS TLV types are maintained by the IANA. Extensions to OSPF that
require a new LLS TLV type MUST be reviewed by a Designated Expert
from the routing area.
The criteria for allocating LLS TLVs are:
o LLS should not be used for information that would be better suited
to be advertised in a link-local link state advertisement (LSA).
o LLS should be confined to signaling between direct neighbors.
o Discretion should be used in the volume of information signaled
using LLS due to the obvious MTU and performance implications.
Following the policies outlined in [IANA], LLS type values in the
range of 0-32767 are allocated through an IETF Review and LLS type
values in the range of 32768-65535 are reserved for private use.
This document assigns the following LLS TLV types in OSPFv2/OSPFv3.
TLV Type Name Reference
0 Reserved
1 Extended Options and Flags [RFC5613]
2 Cryptographic Authentication+ [RFC5613]
3-32767 Reserved for assignment by the IANA
32768-65535 Private Use
+ Cryptographic Authentication TLV is only defined for OSPFv2
IANA renamed the sub-registry from "LLS Type 1 Extended Options" to
"LLS Type 1 Extended Options and Flags".
This document also assigns the following bits in the EOF-TLV outlined
in Section 2.5:
Bit Name Reference
0x00000001 LSDB Resynchronization (LR) [RFC4811]
0x00000002 Restart Signal (RS-bit) [RFC4812]
Future allocation of Extended Options and Flags bits MUST be reviewed
by a Designated Expert from the routing area.
4. Compatibility Issues
The modifications to OSPF packet formats are compatible with standard
OSPF since OSPF routers not supporting LLS will ignore the LLS data
block after the OSPF packet or cryptographic message digest. As of
this writing, there are implementations deployed with [RFC4813]-
compliant software. Routers not implementing [RFC4813] ignore the
LLS data at the end of the OSPF packet.
Careful consideration should be given to carrying additional LLS
data, as it may affect the OSPF adjacency bring-up time due to
additional propagation delay and/or processing time.
5. Security Considerations
Security considerations inherited from OSPFv2 are described in
[OSPFV2]. This technique provides the same level of security as the
basic OSPFv2 protocol by allowing LLS data to be authenticated using
the same cryptographic authentication that OSPFv2 uses (see
Section 2.5 for more details).
Security considerations inherited from OSPFv3 are described in
[OSPFV3] and [OSPFV3AUTH]. OSPFv3 utilizes IPsec for authentication
and encryption. With IPsec, the AH (Authentication Header), ESP
(Encapsulating Security Payload), or both are applied to the entire
OSPFv3 payload including the LLS block.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing
an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 5226, May 2008.
[KEY] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[OSPFV2] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, RFC 2328,
April 1998.
[OSPFV3] Coltun, R., Ferguson, D., Moy, J., and A. Lindem, "OSPF
for IPv6", RFC 5340, July 2008.
[OSPFV3AUTH] Gupta, M. and N. Melam, "Authentication/Confidentiality
for OSPFv3", RFC 4552, June 2006.
6.2. Informative References
[ENTNUM] IANA, "PRIVATE ENTERPRISE NUMBERS",
http://www.iana.org.
[OOB] Nguyen, L., Roy, A., and A. Zinin, "OSPF Out-of-Band
Link State Database (LSDB) Resynchronization",
RFC 4811, March 2007.
[RESTART] Nguyen, L., Roy, A., and A. Zinin, "OSPF Restart
Signaling", RFC 4812, March 2007.
[RFC4813] Friedman, B., Nguyen, L., Roy, A., Yeung, D., and A.
Zinin, "OSPF Link-Local Signaling", RFC 4813,
March 2007.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge Russ White, Acee Lindem, and
Manral Vishwas for their review of this document.
Appendix B. Changes from RFC 4813
This section describes the substantive change from [RFC4813].
o Added OSPFv3 support
o Private TLVs MUST use private enterprise code
o Clarified requirement levels at several places
o Changed from Experimental to Standards Track
Authors' Addresses
Alex Zinin
Alcatel-Lucent
Singapore
EMail: alex.zinin@alcatel-lucent.com
Abhay Roy
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
EMail: akr@cisco.com
Liem Nguyen
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
EMail: lhnguyen@cisco.com
Barry Friedman
Google, Inc.
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
EMail: barryf@google.com
Derek Yeung
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
EMail: myeung@cisco.com
ISO Plain Language
On this page
§1Why OSPF Needed a Way to Carry Extra Data
OSPF is a link-state intra-domain routing protocol. Its routers exchange information on a link using packets that follow a well-defined fixed format. That format is not flexible enough to enable new features that need to exchange arbitrary data.
The document describes a backward-compatible technique to perform link-local signaling, that is, to exchange arbitrary data on a link. One potential way of solving the task could be introducing a new packet type, but that would mean introducing extra packets on the network that may not be desirable and may cause backward compatibility issues. The document therefore describes how to exchange data using standard OSPF packet types.
The extension applies to both OSPFv2 and OSPFv3. Throughout the document, OSPF is used when the text applies to both, and OSPFv2 or OSPFv3 when the text is protocol specific. The document does not specify how the data transmitted by the mechanism should be interpreted by OSPF routers, and it notes that routers that do not understand LLS may receive these packets, and that changes made because of the block's triplets do not affect basic routing when interacting with those routers.
The rule was that the routing protocol itself must not change. Any new feature has to fit inside the packets OSPF already sends, and a router that has never heard of the feature must carry on working.
§2The LLS Data Block and the L-Bit
To perform link-local signaling, OSPF routers add a special data block to the end of OSPF packets, or right after the authentication data block when cryptographic authentication is used. The length of the LLS block is not included in the length of the OSPF packet, but it is included in the IPv4 or IPv6 packet length.
The block may be attached to OSPF Hello and Database Description packets. It must not be attached to any other OSPF packet types on generation, and must be ignored on reception.
The data included in a Hello packet may be used for dynamic signaling, since Hello packets may be sent at any time, but delivery of LLS data in Hello packets is not guaranteed. The data sent with Database Description packets is guaranteed to be delivered as part of the adjacency forming process.
A new L-bit, where L stands for LLS, is introduced into the OSPF Options field. Routers set it in Hello and Database Description packets to indicate that the packet contains an LLS data block, so the block is only examined if the bit is set. The bit must not be set except in Hello and Database Description packets that contain such a block.
The block itself begins with a checksum field holding the standard IP checksum for the entire contents of the block, computed after setting the checksum field to zero. If the checksum is incorrect, the OSPF packet must be processed, but the LLS block must be discarded. The 16-bit LLS Data Length field holds the length of the block, including header and payload, in 32-bit words. If the OSPF packet is cryptographically authenticated, the LLS block must also be cryptographically authenticated; in that case the regular checksum is not calculated and is set to zero instead.
The block rides along in the two packets used while an adjacency comes up. The Hello packet is cheap to send at any moment but its contents may be lost, while the database description packet is guaranteed to arrive during the handshake.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Checksum | LLS Data Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| LLS TLVs |
. .
. .
. .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+§2.3The Type/Length/Value Triplets
The contents of an LLS data block are constructed using triplets, each with a Type field, a Length field and a Value field. The Type field contains the TLV identifier, which is unique for each type of TLV. The Length field contains the length of the Value field in bytes. The Value field is variable and contains arbitrary data.
All TLVs must be 32-bit aligned, with padding if necessary. TLVs are always padded to a 32-bit boundary, but the padding bytes are not included in the TLV Length field, though they are included in the LLS Data Length field in the block header. Unrecognized TLV types are ignored.
One TLV is defined by this document for announcing capabilities and signalling. The Extended Options and Flags TLV has a Type value of 1 and a Value field of 4 bytes, and it must only appear once in the block. Bits in its value have no meaning to the link-local signaling mechanism itself, but bits may be allocated to announce OSPF link-local capabilities, and bits may also be allocated to perform boolean link-local signaling. Two such bits are assigned: the LSDB Resynchronization bit at 0x00000001 and the Restart Signal bit at 0x00000002.
LLS type values in the range of 32768 to 65535 are reserved for private use, and the first four octets of the Value field must be the private enterprise code, which allows multiple vendor extensions to coexist in a network. The criteria for allocating LLS TLVs are that LLS should not be used for information that would be better suited to a link-local link state advertisement, that LLS should be confined to signaling between direct neighbours, and that discretion should be used in the volume of information signalled because of the obvious MTU and performance implications.
Inside the block is a list of small numbered records. Each one says what it is, how long it is, and holds the data. A router that meets a record it does not know skips it and carries on.
- TypeThe identifier of the triplet, unique for each type.
- LengthThe length of the Value field, in bytes.
- ValueVariable, and holds arbitrary data.
- 32-bit alignmentAll triplets must be 32-bit aligned, with padding if necessary.
- Padding is not countedPadding bytes are not included in the Length field, though they are included in the LLS Data Length field.
- Unknown types are ignoredUnrecognized triplet types are ignored by the receiver.
- 0Reserved — Not assigned to anything.
- 1Extended Options and Flags — A 4-byte value carrying link-local capability and signal bits. Must appear only once.
- 2Cryptographic Authentication — Authenticates the LLS block. Defined for OSPFv2 only.
- 3-32767Reserved for IANA — Allocated through IETF review.
- 32768-65535Private use — The first four octets of the value must be the private enterprise code.
- 0x00000001LSDB Resynchronization — The link-state database resynchronization bit.
- 0x00000002Restart Signal — The restart signal bit.
§2.5Authenticating the Block
A special TLV is used for cryptographic authentication of the LLS data block in OSPFv2. This TLV must only be included in the LLS block when cryptographic authentication is enabled on the corresponding interface. The message digest of the LLS block must be calculated using the same key and authentication algorithm as used for the OSPFv2 packet. The cryptographic sequence number is included in the TLV and must be the same as the one in the OSPFv2 authentication data for the LLS block to be considered authentic.
The TLV holds a Type value of 2, a Length field covering the four bytes of the sequence number and the length of the message digest block, the sequence number itself, and the authentication data. The sequence number is the cryptographic sequence number used to prevent simple replay attacks, and for the LLS block to be considered authentic it must match the sequence number in the OSPFv2 packet header authentication field, which must be present. In the event of a sequence number mismatch or an authentication failure, the whole LLS block must be ignored.
The TLV must not appear more than once in the block, and when present it must be the last TLV in the block. If it appears more than once, only the first occurrence is processed and any others must be ignored. The authentication data contains the message digest calculated for the LLS data block up to the authentication data field itself, which therefore excludes it.
The TLV is not applicable to OSPFv3 and must not be added to any OSPFv3 packet; if found on reception it must be ignored.
When the link already uses cryptographic authentication, the extra block is signed with the same key, so a neighbour that receives it can be sure nobody tampered with it. The signing record goes last in the block and carries a counter that must match the one in the packet header.
- Same key and algorithmThe message digest of the LLS block must be calculated using the same key and authentication algorithm as the OSPFv2 packet.
- The sequence number must matchThe cryptographic sequence number in the triplet must be the same as the one in the OSPFv2 packet header authentication field, or the block is not authentic.
- Mismatch discards the blockOn a sequence number mismatch or an authentication failure, the whole LLS block must be ignored.
- Last in the blockThe authentication triplet must not appear more than once, and when present it must be the last one in the block.
- Not for OSPFv3It is not applicable to OSPFv3 and must not be added to any OSPFv3 packet; if found on reception it must be ignored.
§4Compatibility with Routers That Do Not Know LLS
The modifications to the OSPF packet formats are compatible with standard OSPF, because routers that do not support LLS will ignore the LLS data block after the OSPF packet or the cryptographic message digest. As of the writing of this document there were implementations deployed with software compliant to the experimental specification; routers not implementing it ignore the LLS data at the end of the OSPF packet.
Careful consideration should be given to carrying additional LLS data, as it may affect the OSPF adjacency bring-up time due to additional propagation delay and processing time.
An old router reads the packet, stops at the end of what it understands, and ignores the rest. The cost is a little more work and a slightly slower handshake when the block carries a lot of data.
- Old routers skip itRouters that do not support LLS ignore the data block after the OSPF packet or the cryptographic message digest.
- The earlier experimentImplementations of the experimental specification were already deployed, and routers without it ignore the LLS data at the end of the packet.
- Routing is unaffectedChanges made because of the block do not affect basic routing when interacting with routers that do not understand LLS.
- It is not freeCarrying extra LLS data may slow adjacency bring-up because of additional propagation delay and processing time.
§5Security Considerations
Security considerations inherited from OSPFv2 are described in the OSPFv2 specification. The technique provides the same level of security as the basic OSPFv2 protocol by allowing LLS data to be authenticated using the same cryptographic authentication that OSPFv2 uses.
Security considerations inherited from OSPFv3 are described in the OSPFv3 and OSPFv3 authentication documents. OSPFv3 uses IPsec for authentication and encryption. With IPsec, the Authentication Header, the Encapsulating Security Payload, or both are applied to the entire OSPFv3 payload including the LLS block.
The extra data gets the same protection as the rest of the protocol. In OSPFv2 that means the same signing key; in OSPFv3 the whole packet, extra block included, is covered by IPsec.