EAP Types for TLS 1.3: TLS-Based Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Types for Use with TLS 1.3

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          A. DeKok
Request for Comments: 9427                                    FreeRADIUS
Updates: 4851, 5281, 7170                                      June 2023
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721


 TLS-Based Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Types for Use with
                                TLS 1.3

Abstract

   The Extensible Authentication Protocol-TLS (EAP-TLS) (RFC 5216) has
   been updated for TLS 1.3 in RFC 9190.  Many other EAP Types also
   depend on TLS, such as EAP-Flexible Authentication via Secure
   Tunneling (EAP-FAST) (RFC 4851), EAP-Tunneled TLS (EAP-TTLS) (RFC
   5281), the Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) (RFC
   7170).  It is possible that many vendor-specific EAP methods, such as
   the Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP), depend on
   TLS as well.  This document updates those methods in order to use the
   new key derivation methods available in TLS 1.3.  Additional changes
   necessitated by TLS 1.3 are also discussed.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9427.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
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   Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
   in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
     1.1.  Requirements Language
   2.  Using TLS-Based EAP Methods with TLS 1.3
     2.1.  Key Derivation
     2.2.  TEAP
       2.2.1.  Client Certificates
     2.3.  EAP-FAST
       2.3.1.  Client Certificates
     2.4.  EAP-TTLS
       2.4.1.  Client Certificates
     2.5.  PEAP
       2.5.1.  Client Certificates
   3.  Application Data
     3.1.  Identities
   4.  Resumption
   5.  Security Considerations
     5.1.  Handling of TLS NewSessionTicket Messages
     5.2.  Protected Success and Failure Indications
   6.  IANA Considerations
   7.  References
     7.1.  Normative References
     7.2.  Informative References
   Acknowledgments
   Author's Address

1.  Introduction

   EAP-TLS has been updated for TLS 1.3 in [RFC9190].  Many other EAP
   Types also depend on TLS, such as EAP-FAST [RFC4851], EAP-TTLS
   [RFC5281], and TEAP [RFC7170].  It is possible that many vendor-
   specific EAP methods, such as PEAP [PEAP], depend on TLS as well.
   All of these methods use key derivation functions that are no longer
   applicable to TLS 1.3; thus, these methods are incompatible with TLS
   1.3.

   This document updates these methods in order to be used with TLS 1.3.
   These changes involve defining new key derivation functions.  We also
   discuss implementation issues in order to highlight differences
   between TLS 1.3 and earlier versions of TLS.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Using TLS-Based EAP Methods with TLS 1.3

   In general, all of the requirements in [RFC9190] apply to other EAP
   methods that wish to use TLS 1.3.  Unless otherwise required herein,
   implementations of EAP methods that wish to use TLS 1.3 MUST follow
   the guidelines in [RFC9190].

   There remain some differences between EAP-TLS and other TLS-based EAP
   methods that are addressed by this document.  The main difference is
   that [RFC9190] uses the EAP-TLS Type (value 0x0D) in a number of
   calculations, whereas other method types will use their own Type
   value instead of the EAP-TLS Type value.  This topic is discussed
   further in Section 2.1.

   An additional difference is that [RFC9190], Section 2.5 requires the
   EAP server to send a protected success result indication once the
   EAP-TLS handshake has completed.  This indication is composed of one
   octet (0x00) of application data.  Other TLS-based EAP methods also
   use this result indication, but only during resumption.  When other
   TLS-based EAP methods use full authentication, the result indication
   is not needed or used.  This topic is explained in more detail in
   Sections 3 and 4.

   Finally, this document includes clarifications on how various TLS-
   based parameters are calculated when using TLS 1.3.  These parameters
   are different for each EAP method, so they are discussed separately.

2.1.  Key Derivation

   The key derivation for TLS-based EAP methods depends on the value of
   the EAP Type as defined by [IANA] in the "Extensible Authentication
   Protocol (EAP) Registry".  The most important definition is of the
   Type field, as first defined in [RFC3748], Section 2:

      Type = value of the EAP Method type

   For the purposes of this specification, when we refer to logical
   Type, we mean that the logical Type is defined as one octet for
   values smaller than 254 (the value for the Expanded Type).  When
   Expanded EAP Types are used, the logical Type is defined as the
   concatenation of the fields required to define the Expanded Type,
   including the Type with value 0xfe, Vendor-Id (in network byte
   order), and Vendor-Type fields (in network byte order) defined in
   [RFC3748], Section 5.7, as given below:

   Type = 0xFE || Vendor-Id || Vendor-Type

   This definition does not alter the meaning of Type in [RFC3748] or
   change the structure of EAP packets.  Instead, this definition allows
   us to simplify references to EAP Types by using a logical "Type"
   instead of referring to "the Type field or the Type field with value
   0xfe, plus the Vendor-ID and Vendor-Type".  For example, the value of
   Type for PEAP is simply 0x19.

   Note that unlike TLS 1.2 and earlier, the calculation of the TLS-
   Exporter function depends on the length passed to it.  Therefore,
   implementations MUST pass the correct length instead of passing a
   large length and truncating the output.  Any output calculated using
   a larger length value, which is then truncated, will be different
   from the output that was calculated using the correct length.

   Unless otherwise discussed below, the key derivation functions for
   all TLS-based EAP Types are defined in [RFC9190], Section 2.3 and
   reproduced here for clarity.  These definitions include ones for the
   Master Session Key (MSK) and the Extended Master Session Key (EMSK):

   Key_Material = TLS-Exporter("EXPORTER_EAP_TLS_Key_Material",
                                Type, 128)
   Method-Id    = TLS-Exporter("EXPORTER_EAP_TLS_Method-Id",
                                Type, 64)
   Session-Id   = Type || Method-Id
   MSK          = Key_Material(0, 63)
   EMSK         = Key_Material(64, 127)

   We note that these definitions reuse the EAP-TLS exporter labels and
   change the derivation only by adding a dependency on the logical
   Type.  The reason for this change is simplicity.  The inclusion of
   the EAP Type makes the derivation method specific.  There is no need
   to use different labels for different EAP Types as was done earlier.

   These definitions apply in their entirety to EAP-TTLS [RFC5281] and
   PEAP as defined in [PEAP] and [MSPEAP].  Some definitions apply to
   EAP-FAST and TEAP with exceptions as noted below.

   It is RECOMMENDED that vendor-defined and TLS-based EAP methods use
   the above definitions for TLS 1.3.  There is no compelling reason to
   use different definitions.

2.2.  TEAP

   TEAP previously used a Protected Access Credential (PAC), which is
   functionally equivalent to session tickets provided by TLS 1.3 that
   contain a pre-shared key (PSK) along with other data.  As such, the
   use of a PAC is deprecated for TEAP in TLS 1.3.  PAC provisioning, as
   defined in [RFC7170], Section 3.8.1, is also no longer part of TEAP
   when TLS 1.3 is used.

   [RFC7170], Section 5.2 gives a definition for the Inner Method
   Session Key (IMSK), which depends on the TLS Pseudorandom Function
   (PRF) (also known as TLS-PRF).  When the j'th inner method generates
   an EMSK, we update that definition for TLS 1.3 as:

   IMSK[j] = TLS-Exporter("TEAPbindkey@ietf.org", secret, 32)

   The secret is the EMSK or MSK from the j'th inner method.  When an
   inner method does not provide an EMSK or MSK, IMSK[j] is 32 octets of
   zero.

   The other key derivations for TEAP are given here.  All derivations
   not given here are the same as given above in the previous section.
   These derivations are also used for EAP-FAST, but using the EAP-FAST
   Type.

   The derivation of the IMSKs, Inner Method Compound Keys (IMCKs), and
   Compound Session Keys (CMKs) is given below.

   session_key_seed = TLS-Exporter("EXPORTER: teap session key seed",
                                   Type, 40)

   S-IMCK[0] = session_key_seed
   For j = 1 to n-1 do
     IMCK[j] = TLS-Exporter("EXPORTER: Inner Methods Compound Keys",
                            S-IMCK[j-1] || IMSK[j], 60)
     S-IMCK[j] = first 40 octets of IMCK[j]
     CMK[j] = last 20 octets of IMCK[j]

      Note: In these definitions, || denotes concatenation.

   In TLS 1.3, the derivation of IMCK[j] uses both a different label and
   a different order of concatenating fields than what was used by TEAP
   with TLS 1.2.  Similarly, the session_key_seed in TLS 1.3 uses the
   Type as the context.  In TLS 1.2, the context was a zero-length
   field.

   The outer MSK and EMSK are then derived from the final ("n"th) inner
   method, as follows:

   MSK  = TLS-Exporter(
        "EXPORTER: Session Key Generating Function",
        S-IMCK[n], 64)

   EMSK = TLS-Exporter(
        "EXPORTER: Extended Session Key Generating Function",
        S-IMCK[n], 64)

   The TEAP Compound Message Authentication Code (MAC) defined in
   [RFC7170], Section 5.3 remains the same, but the MAC for TLS 1.3 is
   computed with the Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm
   negotiated for the HMAC-based Key Derivation Function (HKDF) in the
   key schedule, as per [RFC8446], Section 7.1.  That is, the MAC used
   is the MAC derived from the TLS handshake:

   Compound-MAC = MAC( CMK[n], BUFFER )

   where we define CMK[n] as the CMK taken from the final ("n"th) inner
   method.

   For TLS 1.3, the MAC is computed with the HMAC algorithm negotiated
   for HKDF in the key schedule, as per [RFC8446], Section 7.1.  That
   is, the MAC used is the MAC derived from the TLS handshake.

   The definition of BUFFER is unchanged from [RFC7170], Section 5.3.

2.2.1.  Client Certificates

   The use of client certificates is still permitted when using TEAP
   with TLS 1.3.  However, if the client certificate is accepted, then
   the EAP peer MUST proceed with additional authentication of Phase 2,
   as per [RFC7170], Section 7.6.  If there is no Phase 2 data, then the
   EAP server MUST reject the session.

   While [RFC5281], Section 7.6 permits "authentication of the client
   via client certificate during phase 1, with no additional
   authentication or information exchange required," this practice is
   forbidden when TEAP is used with TLS 1.3.  If there is a requirement
   to use client certificates with no inner tunnel methods, then EAP-TLS
   should be used instead of TEAP.

   [RFC7170], Section 7.4.1 suggests that client certificates should be
   sent in Phase 2 of the TEAP exchange "since TLS client certificates
   are sent in the clear".  While TLS 1.3 no longer sends client
   certificates in the clear, TEAP implementations need to distinguish
   identities for both User and Machine using the Identity-Type TLV
   (with values 1 and 2, respectively).  When a client certificate is
   sent outside of the TLS tunnel, it MUST include Identity-Type as an
   outer TLV in order to signal the type of identity which that client
   certificate is for.

2.3.  EAP-FAST

   For EAP-FAST, the session_key_seed is also part of the key_block as
   defined in [RFC4851], Section 5.1.

   The definitions of S-IMCK[n], MSK, and EMSK are the same as given
   above for TEAP.  We reiterate that the EAP-FAST Type must be used
   when deriving the session_key_seed and not the TEAP Type.

   Unlike [RFC4851], Section 5.2, the definition of IMCK[j] places the
   reference to S-IMCK after the textual label and then concatenates the
   IMSK instead of the MSK.

   EAP-FAST previously used a PAC that is functionally equivalent to
   session tickets provided by TLS 1.3, which contain a PSK along with
   other data.  As such, the use of a PAC is deprecated for EAP-FAST in
   TLS 1.3.  PAC provisioning [RFC5422] is also no longer part of EAP-
   FAST when TLS 1.3 is used.

   The T-PRF given in [RFC4851], Section 5.5 is not used for TLS 1.3.
   Instead, it is replaced with the TLS 1.3 TLS-Exporter function.

2.3.1.  Client Certificates

   The use of client certificates is still permitted when using EAP-FAST
   with TLS 1.3.  However, if the client certificate is accepted, then
   the EAP peer MUST proceed with additional authentication of Phase 2,
   as per [RFC4851], Section 7.4.1.  If there is no Phase 2 data, then
   the EAP server MUST reject the session.

   While [RFC4851] implicitly permits the use of client certificates
   without proceeding to Phase 2, this practice is forbidden when EAP-
   FAST is used with TLS 1.3.  If there is a requirement to use client
   certificates with no inner tunnel methods, then EAP-TLS should be
   used instead of EAP-FAST.

2.4.  EAP-TTLS

   [RFC5281], Section 11.1 defines an implicit challenge when the inner
   methods of the Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP)
   [RFC1994], MS-CHAP [RFC2433], or MS-CHAPv2 [RFC2759] are used.  The
   derivation for TLS 1.3 is instead given as:

   EAP-TTLS_challenge = TLS-Exporter("ttls challenge",, n)

   There is no "context_value" ([RFC8446], Section 7.5) passed to the
   TLS-Exporter function.  The value "n" given here is the length of the
   data required; [RFC5281] requires it to be 17 octets for CHAP
   ([RFC5281], Section 11.2.2) and MS-CHAPv2 ([RFC5281],
   Section 11.2.4), and 9 octets for MS-CHAP ([RFC5281],
   Section 11.2.3).

   When the Password Authentication Protocol (PAP), CHAP, or MS-CHAPv1
   are used as inner authentication methods, there is no opportunity for
   the EAP server to send a protected success indication, as is done in
   [RFC9190], Section 2.5.  Instead, when TLS session tickets are
   disabled, the response from the EAP server MUST be either EAP-Success
   or EAP-Failure.  These responses are unprotected and can be forged by
   a skilled attacker.

   Where TLS session tickets are enabled, the response from the EAP
   server may also continue TLS negotiation with a TLS NewSessionTicket
   message.  Since this message is protected by TLS, it can serve as the
   protected success indication.

   Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that EAP servers always send a TLS
   NewSessionTicket message, even if resumption is not configured.  When
   the EAP peer attempts to use the ticket, the EAP server can instead
   request a full authentication.  As noted earlier, implementations
   SHOULD NOT send TLS NewSessionTicket messages until the "inner
   tunnel" authentication has completed in order to take full advantage
   of the message as a protected success indication.

   When resumption is not used, the TLS NewSessionTicket message is not
   available and some authentication methods will not have a protected
   success indication.  While we would like to always have a protected
   success indication, limitations of the underlying protocols,
   implementations, and deployment requirements make that impossible.

   EAP peers MUST continue running their EAP state machine until they
   receive either an EAP-Success or an EAP-Failure.  Receiving a TLS
   NewSessionTicket message in response to inner method PAP, CHAP, or
   MS-CHAP authentication is normal and MUST NOT be treated as a
   failure.

2.4.1.  Client Certificates

   [RFC5281], Section 7.6 permits "authentication of the client via
   client certificate during phase 1, with no additional authentication
   or information exchange required."  This practice is forbidden when
   EAP-TTLS is used with TLS 1.3.  If there is a requirement to use
   client certificates with no inner tunnel methods, then EAP-TLS should
   be used instead of EAP-TTLS.

   The use of client certificates is still permitted when using EAP-TTLS
   with TLS 1.3.  However, if the client certificate is accepted, then
   the EAP peer MUST proceed with additional authentication of Phase 2,
   as per [RFC5281], Section 7.2.  If there is no Phase 2 data, then the
   EAP server MUST reject the session.

2.5.  PEAP

   When PEAP uses crypto binding, it uses a different key calculation
   defined in [PEAP-MPPE] that consumes inner EAP method keying
   material.  The PRF+ function used in [PEAP-MPPE] is not taken from
   the TLS exporter but is instead calculated via a different method
   that is given in [PEAP-PRF].  That derivation remains unchanged in
   this specification.

   Note that the above derivation uses SHA-1, which may be formally
   deprecated in the near future.

   However, the PRF+ calculation uses a PEAP Tunnel Key (TK), which is
   defined in [PEAP-TK] as:

   |  ... the TK is the first 60 octets of the Key_Material, as
   |  specified in [RFC5216]: TLS-PRF-128 (master secret, "client EAP
   |  encryption", client.random || server.random).

   We note that the text in [PEAP-PRF] does not define Key_Material.
   Instead, it defines TK as the first octets of Key_Material and gives
   a definition of Key_Material that is appropriate for TLS versions
   before TLS 1.3.

   For TLS 1.3, the TK should be derived from the Key_Material defined
   here in Section 2.1 instead of using the TLS-PRF-128 derivation given
   in [PEAP-PRF].  The method defined in [PEAP-TK] MUST NOT be used.

2.5.1.  Client Certificates

   As with EAP-TTLS, [PEAP] permits the use of client certificates in
   addition to inner tunnel methods.  The practice of using client
   certificates with no "inner method" is forbidden when PEAP is used
   with TLS 1.3.  If there is a requirement to use client certificates
   with no inner tunnel methods, then EAP-TLS should be used instead of
   PEAP.

   The use of client certificates is still permitted when using PEAP
   with TLS 1.3.  However, if the client certificate is accepted, then
   the EAP peer MUST proceed with additional authentication of the inner
   tunnel.  If there is no inner tunnel authentication data, then the
   EAP server MUST reject the session.

3.  Application Data

   Unlike previous TLS versions, TLS 1.3 can continue negotiation after
   the initial TLS handshake has been completed; TLS 1.3 calls this the
   "CONNECTED" state.  Some implementations use receipt of a Finished
   message as an indication that TLS negotiation has completed and that
   an "inner tunnel" session can now be negotiated.  This assumption is
   not always correct with TLS 1.3.

   Earlier TLS versions did not send application data along with the
   Finished message.  It was then possible for implementations to assume
   that a receipt of a Finished message also meant that there was no
   application data available and that another round trip was required.

   This assumption is not true with TLS 1.3, and applications relying on
   that behavior will not operate correctly with TLS 1.3.

   As a result, implementations MUST check for application data once the
   TLS session has been established.  This check MUST be performed
   before proceeding with another round trip of TLS negotiation.  TLS-
   based EAP methods, such as EAP-TTLS, PEAP, and EAP-FAST, each have
   method-specific application data that MUST be processed according to
   the EAP Type.

   TLS 1.3 in [RFC8446], Section 4.6.1 also permits NewSessionTicket
   messages to be sent after the server has received the client Finished
   message, which is a change from earlier TLS versions.  This change
   can cause implementations to fail in a number of different ways due
   to a reliance on implicit behavior seen in earlier TLS versions.

   In order to correct this failure, we require that implementations
   MUST NOT send or expect to receive application data in the TLS
   session if the underlying TLS connection is still performing
   negotiation.  Implementations MUST delay processing of application
   data until such time as the TLS negotiation has finished.  If the TLS
   negotiation is successful, then the application data can be examined.
   If the TLS negotiation is unsuccessful, then the application data is
   untrusted; therefore, it MUST be discarded without being examined.

   The default for many TLS library implementations is to send a
   NewSessionTicket message immediately after or along with the Finished
   message.  This ticket could be used for resumption, even if the
   "inner tunnel" authentication has not been completed.  If the ticket
   could be used, then it could allow a malicious EAP peer to completely
   bypass the "inner tunnel" authentication.

   Therefore, the EAP server MUST NOT permit any session ticket to
   successfully resume authentication unless the inner tunnel
   authentication has completed successfully.  The alternative would
   allow an attacker to bypass authentication by obtaining a session
   ticket, immediately closing the current session, and "resuming" using
   the session ticket.

   To protect against that attack, implementations SHOULD NOT send
   NewSessionTicket messages until the "inner tunnel" authentication has
   completed.  There is no reason to send session tickets that will
   later be invalidated or ignored.  However, we recognize that this
   suggestion may not always be possible to implement with some
   available TLS libraries.  As such, EAP servers MUST take care to
   either invalidate or discard session tickets that are associated with
   sessions that terminate in EAP Failure.

   The NewSessionTicket message SHOULD also be sent along with other
   application data, if possible.  Sending that message alone prolongs
   the packet exchange to no benefit.  In addition to prolonging the
   packet exchange, using a separate NewSessionTicket message can lead
   to non-interoperable implementations.

   [RFC9190], Section 2.5 requires a protected result indication, which
   indicates that TLS negotiation has finished.  Methods that use "inner
   tunnel" methods MUST instead begin their "inner tunnel" negotiation
   by sending Type-specific application data.

3.1.  Identities

   For EAP-TLS, Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.7 of [RFC9190] recommend the use
   of anonymous Network Access Identifiers (NAIs) [RFC7542] in the EAP
   Response/Identity packet.  However, as EAP-TLS does not send
   application data inside of the TLS tunnel, that specification does
   not address the subject of "inner" identities in tunneled EAP
   methods.  However, this subject must be addressed for the tunneled
   methods.

   Using an anonymous NAI for the outer identity as per [RFC7542],
   Section 2.4 has a few benefits.  An NAI allows the EAP session to be
   routed in a AAA framework as described in [RFC7542], Section 3.
   Using an anonymous realm also ensures that user identifiers are kept
   private.

   As for the inner identity, we define it generically as the
   identification information carried inside of the TLS tunnel.  For
   PEAP, that identity may be an EAP Response/Identity.  For EAP-TTLS,
   it may be the User-Name attribute.  Vendor-specific EAP methods that
   use TLS will generally also have an inner identity.  This identity is
   carried inside of the TLS tunnel and is therefore both routed to the
   correct destination by the outer identity and kept private by the use
   of TLS.

   In other words, we can view the outer TLS layer of tunneled EAP
   methods as a secure transport layer that is responsible for getting
   the actual (inner) authentication credentials securely from the EAP
   peer to the EAP server.  The EAP server then uses the inner identity
   and inner authentication data to identify and authenticate a
   particular user.

   As the authentication data is routed to the correct destination,
   there is little reason for the inner identity to also contain a
   realm.  Therefore, we have a few recommendations on the inner and
   outer identities, along with their relationship to each other.

   The outer identity SHOULD use an anonymous NAI realm that allows for
   both user privacy and for the EAP session to be routed in a AAA
   framework as described in [RFC7542], Section 3.  Where NAI realms are
   not used, packets will not be routable outside of the local
   organization.

   The inner identity MUST NOT use an anonymous NAI realm.  If anonymous
   network access is desired, EAP peers MUST use EAP-TLS without peer
   authentication, as per [RFC9190], Section 2.1.5.  EAP servers MUST
   cause authentication to fail if an EAP peer uses an anonymous "inner"
   identity for any TLS-based EAP method.

   Implementations SHOULD NOT use inner identities that contain an NAI
   realm.  Many organizations typically use only one realm for all user
   accounts.

   However, there are situations where it is useful for an inner
   identity to contain a realm.  For example, an organization may have
   multiple independent sub-organizations, each with a different and
   unique realm.  These realms may be independent of one another, or the
   realms may be a subdomain (or subdomains) of the public outer realm.

   In that case, an organization can configure one public "routing"
   realm and multiple separate "inner" realms.  This separation of
   realms also allows an organization to split users into logical groups
   by realm, where the "user" portion of the NAI may otherwise conflict.
   For example, "user@example.com" and "user@example.org" are different
   NAIs that can both be used as inner identities.

   Using only one public realm both keeps internal information private
   and simplifies realm management for external entities by minimizing
   the number of realms that have to be tracked by them.

   In most situations, routing identifiers should be associated with the
   authentication data that they are routing.  For example, if a user
   has an inner identity of "user@example.com", then it generally makes
   little sense to have an outer identity of "@example.org".  The
   authentication request would then be routed to the "example.org"
   domain, which may have no idea what to do with the credentials for
   "user@example.com".  At best, the authentication request would be
   discarded.  At worst, the "example.org" domain could harvest user
   credentials for later use in attacks on "example.com".

   When an EAP server receives an inner identity for a realm which it is
   not authoritative, it MUST reject the authentication.  There is no
   reason for one organization to authenticate users from a different
   (and independent) organization.

   In addition, associating inner/outer identities from different
   organizations in the same EAP authentication session means that
   otherwise unrelated realms are tied together, which can make networks
   more fragile.

   For example, an organization that uses a "hosted" AAA provider may
   choose to use the realm of the AAA provider as the outer identity for
   user authentication.  The inner identity can then be fully qualified:
   username plus realm of the organization.  This practice may result in
   successful authentications, but it has practical difficulties.

   Additionally, an organization may host their own AAA servers but use
   a "cloud" identity provider to hold user accounts.  In that
   situation, the organizations could try to use their own realm as the
   outer (routing) identity and then use an identity from the "cloud"
   provider as the inner identity.

   This practice is NOT RECOMMENDED.  User accounts for an organization
   should be qualified as belonging to that organization and not to an
   unrelated third party.  There is no reason to tie the configuration
   of user systems to public realm routing; that configuration more
   properly belongs in the network.

   Both of these practices mean that changing "cloud" providers is
   difficult.  When such a change happens, each individual EAP peer must
   be updated with a different outer identity that points to the new
   "cloud" provider.  This process can be expensive, and some EAP peers
   may not be online when this changeover happens.  The result could be
   devices or users who are unable to obtain network access, even if all
   relevant network systems are online and functional.

   Further, standards such as [RFC7585] allow for dynamic discovery of
   home servers for authentication.  This specification has been widely
   deployed and means that there is minimal cost to routing
   authentication to a particular domain.  The authentication can also
   be routed to a particular identity provider and changed at will with
   no loss of functionality.  That specification is also scalable since
   it does not require changes to many systems when a domain updates its
   configuration.  Instead, only one thing has to change: the
   configuration of that domain.  Everything else is discovered
   dynamically.

   That is, changing the configuration for one domain is significantly
   simpler and more scalable than changing the configuration for
   potentially millions of end-user devices.

   We recognize that there may be existing use cases where the inner and
   outer identities use different realms.  As such, we cannot forbid
   that practice.  We hope that the discussion above shows not only why
   such practices are problematic, but how alternative methods are more
   flexible, more scalable, and are easier to manage.

4.  Resumption

   [RFC9190], Section 2.1.3 defines the process for resumption.  This
   process is the same for all TLS-based EAP Types.  The only practical
   difference is that the value of the Type field is different.  The
   requirements on identities, use of TLS cipher suites, resumption,
   etc. remain unchanged from that document.

   Note that if resumption is performed, then the EAP server MUST send
   the protected success result indication (one octet of 0x00) inside
   the TLS tunnel, as per [RFC9190].  The EAP peer MUST in turn check
   for the existence of the protected success result indication (one
   octet of 0x00) and cause authentication to fail if that octet is not
   received.  If either the peer or the server initiates an inner tunnel
   method instead, then that method MUST be followed, and inner
   authentication MUST NOT be skipped.

   All TLS-based EAP methods support resumption, as it is a property of
   the underlying TLS protocol.  All EAP servers and peers MUST support
   resumption for all TLS-based EAP methods.  We note that EAP servers
   and peers can still choose to not resume any particular session.  For
   example, EAP servers may forbid resumption for administrative or
   other policy reasons.

   It is RECOMMENDED that EAP servers and peers enable resumption and
   use it where possible.  The use of resumption decreases the number of
   round trips used for authentication.  This decrease leads to lower
   latency for authentications and less load on the EAP server.
   Resumption can also lower load on external systems, such as databases
   that contain user credentials.

   As the packet flows for resumption are essentially identical across
   all TLS-based EAP Types, it is technically possible to authenticate
   using EAP-TLS (Type 13) and then perform resumption using another EAP
   Type, such as with EAP-TTLS (Type 21).  However, there is no
   practical benefit to doing so.  It is also not clear what this
   behavior would mean or what (if any) security issues there may be
   with it.  As a result, this behavior is forbidden.

   EAP servers therefore MUST NOT resume sessions across different EAP
   Types, and EAP servers MUST reject resumptions in which the EAP Type
   value is different from the original authentication.

5.  Security Considerations

   [RFC9190], Section 5 is included here by reference.

   Updating the above EAP methods to use TLS 1.3 is of high importance
   for the Internet community.  Using the most recent security protocols
   can significantly improve security and privacy of a network.

   For PEAP, some derivations use HMAC-SHA1 [PEAP-MPPE].  In the
   interests of interoperability and minimal changes, we do not change
   that derivation, as there are no known security issues with HMAC-
   SHA1.  Further, the data derived from the HMAC-SHA1 calculations is
   exchanged inside of the TLS tunnel and is visible only to users who
   have already successfully authenticated.  As such, the security risks
   are minimal.

5.1.  Handling of TLS NewSessionTicket Messages

   In some cases, client certificates are not used for TLS-based EAP
   methods.  In those cases, the user is authenticated only after
   successful completion of the inner tunnel authentication.  However,
   [RFC8446], Section 4.6.1 states that "at any time after the server
   has received the client Finished message, it MAY send a
   NewSessionTicket message."  This message is sent by the server before
   the inner authentication method has been run and therefore before the
   user has been authenticated.

   This separation of data allows for a "time of use, time of check"
   security issue.  Malicious clients can begin a session and receive a
   NewSessionTicket message.  The malicious client can then abort the
   authentication session and use the obtained NewSessionTicket to
   "resume" the previous session.  If the server allows the session to
   resume without verifying that the user had first been authenticated,
   the malicious client can then obtain network access without ever
   being authenticated.

   As a result, EAP servers MUST NOT assume that a user has been
   authenticated simply because a TLS session is being resumed.  Even if
   a session is being resumed, an EAP server MAY have policies that
   still force the inner authentication methods to be run.  For example,
   the user's password may have expired in the time interval between
   first authentication and session resumption.

   Therefore, the guidelines given here describe situations where an EAP
   server is permitted to allow session resumption rather than where an
   EAP server is required to allow session resumption.  An EAP server
   could simply refuse to issue session tickets or could run the full
   inner authentication, even if a session was resumed.

   Where session tickets are used, the EAP server SHOULD track the
   successful completion of an inner authentication and associate that
   status with any session tickets issued for that session.  This
   requirement can be met in a number of different ways.

   One way is for the EAP server to simply not send any TLS
   NewSessionTicket messages until the inner authentication has
   completed successfully.  The EAP server then knows that the existence
   of a session ticket is proof that a user was authenticated, and the
   session can be resumed.

   Another way is for the EAP server to simply discard or invalidate any
   session tickets until after the inner authentication has completed
   successfully.  When the user is authenticated, a new TLS
   NewSessionTicket message can be sent to the client, and the new
   ticket can be cached and/or validated.

   Another way is for the EAP server to associate the inner
   authentication status with each session ticket.  When a session
   ticket is used, the authentication status is checked.  When a session
   ticket shows that the inner authentication did not succeed, the EAP
   server MUST run the inner authentication method(s) in the resumed
   tunnel and only grant access based on the success or failure of those
   inner methods.

   However, the interaction between EAP implementations and any
   underlying TLS library may be complex, and the EAP server may not be
   able to make the above guarantees.  Where the EAP server is unable to
   determine the user's authentication status from the session ticket,
   it MUST assume that inner authentication has not completed, and it
   MUST run the inner authentication method(s) successfully in the
   resumed tunnel before granting access.

   This issue is not relevant for EAP-TLS, which only uses client
   certificates for authentication in the TLS handshake.  It is only
   relevant for TLS-based EAP methods that do not use the TLS layer to
   authenticate.

5.2.  Protected Success and Failure Indications

   [RFC9190] provides for protected success and failure indications as
   discussed in [RFC4137], Section 4.1.1.  These result indications are
   provided for both full authentication and resumption.

   Other TLS-based EAP methods provide these result indications only for
   resumption.

   For full authentication, the other TLS-based EAP methods do not
   provide for protected success and failure indications as part of the
   outer TLS exchange.  That is, the protected result indication is not
   used, and there is no TLS-layer alert sent when the inner
   authentication fails.  Instead, there is simply either an EAP-Success
   or an EAP-Failure sent.  This behavior is the same as for previous
   TLS versions; therefore, it introduces no new security issues.

   We note that most TLS-based EAP methods provide for success and
   failure indications as part of the authentication exchange performed
   inside of the TLS tunnel.  These result indications are therefore
   protected, as they cannot be modified or forged.

   However, some inner methods do not provide for success or failure
   indications.  For example, the use of EAP-TTLS with inner PAP, CHAP,
   or MS-CHAP.  Those methods send authentication credentials to the EAP
   server via the inner tunnel with no method to signal success or
   failure inside of the tunnel.

   There are functionally equivalent authentication methods that can be
   used to provide protected result indications.  PAP can often be
   replaced with EAP-GTC, CHAP with EAP-MD5, and MS-CHAPv1 with MS-
   CHAPv2 or EAP-MSCHAPv2.  All of the replacement methods provide for
   similar functionality and have protected success and failure
   indication.  The main cost to this change is additional round trips.

   It is RECOMMENDED that implementations deprecate inner tunnel methods
   that do not provide protected success and failure indications when
   TLS session tickets cannot be used.  Implementations SHOULD use EAP-
   GTC instead of PAP and EAP-MD5 instead of CHAP.  Implementations
   SHOULD use MS-CHAPv2 or EAP-MSCHAPv2 instead of MS-CHAPv1.  New TLS-
   based EAP methods MUST provide protected success and failure
   indications inside of the TLS tunnel.

   When the inner authentication protocol indicates that authentication
   has failed, then implementations MUST fail authentication for the
   entire session.  There may be additional protocol exchanges in order
   to exchange more detailed failure indications, but the final result
   MUST be a failed authentication.  As noted earlier, any session
   tickets for this failed authentication MUST be either invalidated or
   discarded.

   Similarly, when the inner authentication protocol indicates that
   authentication has succeeded, implementations SHOULD cause
   authentication to succeed for the entire session.  There MAY be
   additional protocol exchanges that could still cause failure, so we
   cannot mandate sending success on successful authentication.

   In both of these cases, the EAP server MUST send an EAP-Failure or
   EAP-Success message, as indicated by Step 4 in Section 2 of
   [RFC3748].  Even though both parties have already determined the
   final authentication status, the full EAP state machine must still be
   followed.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers
   Authority (IANA) regarding the registration of values related to the
   TLS-based EAP methods for the TLS 1.3 protocol in accordance with
   [RFC8126].

   IANA has added the following labels to the "TLS Exporter Label"
   registry defined by [RFC5705].  These labels are used in the
   derivation of Key_Material and Method-Id as defined above in
   Section 2, and they are used only for TEAP.

    +============================+=========+=============+===========+
    | Value                      | DTLS-OK | Recommended | Reference |
    +============================+=========+=============+===========+
    | EXPORTER: teap session key |    N    |      Y      |  RFC 9427 |
    | seed                       |         |             |           |
    +----------------------------+---------+-------------+-----------+
    | EXPORTER: Inner Methods    |    N    |      Y      |  RFC 9427 |
    | Compound Keys              |         |             |           |
    +----------------------------+---------+-------------+-----------+
    | EXPORTER: Session Key      |    N    |      Y      |  RFC 9427 |
    | Generating Function        |         |             |           |
    +----------------------------+---------+-------------+-----------+
    | EXPORTER: Extended Session |    N    |      Y      |  RFC 9427 |
    | Key Generating Function    |         |             |           |
    +----------------------------+---------+-------------+-----------+
    | TEAPbindkey@ietf.org       |    N    |      Y      |  RFC 9427 |
    +----------------------------+---------+-------------+-----------+

                  Table 1: TLS Exporter Labels Registry

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [IANA]     IANA, "Method Types",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/eap-numbers/>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
              (EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.

   [RFC5216]  Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
              Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, DOI 10.17487/RFC5216,
              March 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5216>.

   [RFC5705]  Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
              March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.

   [RFC7170]  Zhou, H., Cam-Winget, N., Salowey, J., and S. Hanna,
              "Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version
              1", RFC 7170, DOI 10.17487/RFC7170, May 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7170>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC9190]  Preuß Mattsson, J. and M. Sethi, "EAP-TLS 1.3: Using the
              Extensible Authentication Protocol with TLS 1.3",
              RFC 9190, DOI 10.17487/RFC9190, February 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9190>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [MSPEAP]   Microsoft Corporation, "[MS-PEAP]: Protected Extensible
              Authentication Protocol (PEAP)", Protocol Revision 31.0,
              June 2021,
              <https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc238354.aspx>.

   [PEAP]     Palekar, A., Josefsson, S., Simon, D., Zorn, G., Salowey,
              J., and H. Zhou, "Protected EAP Protocol (PEAP) Version
              2", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-josefsson-
              pppext-eap-tls-eap-10, 15 October 2004,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-josefsson-
              pppext-eap-tls-eap-10>.

   [PEAP-MPPE]
              Microsoft Corporation, "Key Management", Section 3.1.5.7,
              October 2020, <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-
              us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-peap/e75b0385-915a-
              4fc3-a549-fd3d06b995b0>.

   [PEAP-PRF] Microsoft Corporation, "Intermediate PEAP MAC Key (IPMK)
              and Compound MAC Key (CMK)", Section 3.1.5.5.2.2, February
              2019, <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
              us/openspecs/windows_protocols/MS-PEAP/0de54161-0bd3-424a-
              9b1a-854b4040a6df>.

   [PEAP-TK]  Microsoft Corporation, "PEAP Tunnel Key (TK)",
              Section 3.1.5.5.2.1, April 2021,
              <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
              us/openspecs/windows_protocols/MS-PEAP/41288c09-3d7d-482f-
              a57f-e83691d4d246>.

   [RFC1994]  Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication
              Protocol (CHAP)", RFC 1994, DOI 10.17487/RFC1994, August
              1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1994>.

   [RFC2433]  Zorn, G. and S. Cobb, "Microsoft PPP CHAP Extensions",
              RFC 2433, DOI 10.17487/RFC2433, October 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2433>.

   [RFC2759]  Zorn, G., "Microsoft PPP CHAP Extensions, Version 2",
              RFC 2759, DOI 10.17487/RFC2759, January 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2759>.

   [RFC4137]  Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba,
              "State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol
              (EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4137, August 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4137>.

   [RFC4851]  Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou, "The
              Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling Extensible
              Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)", RFC 4851,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4851, May 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4851>.

   [RFC5281]  Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible Authentication
              Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated
              Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", RFC 5281,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5281, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5281>.

   [RFC5422]  Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou,
              "Dynamic Provisioning Using Flexible Authentication via
              Secure Tunneling Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP-
              FAST)", RFC 5422, DOI 10.17487/RFC5422, March 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5422>.

   [RFC7542]  DeKok, A., "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 7542,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7542, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7542>.

   [RFC7585]  Winter, S. and M. McCauley, "Dynamic Peer Discovery for
              RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS Based on the Network Access
              Identifier (NAI)", RFC 7585, DOI 10.17487/RFC7585, October
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7585>.

Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Jorge Vergara for a detailed review of the requirements for
   various EAP Types.

   Thanks to Jorge Vergara, Bruno Periera Vidal, Alexander Clouter,
   Karri Huhtanen, and Heikki Vatiainen for reviews of this document and
   for assistance with interoperability testing.

Author's Address

   Alan DeKok
   The FreeRADIUS Server Project
   Email: aland@freeradius.org